Retaining the Hope That Rejection Promises: Why Sunbeam is a Light That Should Not Be Followed by Roth, Benjamin H.
Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal 
Volume 30 
Issue 2 The Eleventh Annual Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal Symposium 
2014 
Retaining the Hope That Rejection Promises: Why Sunbeam is a 
Light That Should Not Be Followed 
Benjamin H. Roth 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj 
Recommended Citation 
Benjamin H. Roth, Retaining the Hope That Rejection Promises: Why Sunbeam is a Light That Should Not 
Be Followed, 30 Emory Bankr. Dev. J. 529 (2014). 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/ebdj/vol30/iss2/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal by an authorized editor of Emory Law 
Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact law-scholarly-commons@emory.edu. 
ROTH GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:19 PM 
 
RETAINING THE HOPE THAT REJECTION PROMISES: WHY 
SUNBEAM IS A LIGHT THAT SHOULD NOT BE FOLLOWED 
ABSTRACT 
Sunbeam Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC 
incorrectly altered the remedies available to a trademark licensee after a 
debtor licensor has rejected the license. Decided in July 2012, this decision by 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit conflicts with decisions going 
back more than twenty-five years, when the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit decided Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc. During that span of time, licensees had a single remedy upon 
rejection of the license: damages in the way of an unsecured prepetition claim. 
Licensees were not granted specific performance, and were not permitted to 
continue using the trademark or retain any other rights under the license, save 
for the claim for damages. Congress had granted guaranteed specific 
performance to the licensee of a patent, copyright, or trade secret through 11 
U.S.C. § 365(n). However, when Congress enacted § 365(n) in 1989, Congress 
explicitly and unequivocally excluded trademark licenses from the protection 
of that provision. 
In July 2012, the Seventh Circuit held in Sunbeam that because trademark 
licensees are not protected by § 365(n), the Bankruptcy Code is silent as to the 
rejection of a trademark license. A licensee was granted the right to continued 
use of the trademark, just as that remedy would be available outside of 
bankruptcy. Ideal as this holding may be, this Comment argues it is 
contradictory to a careful examination and interpretation of the law as it 
applies, and historically has been applied. Fundamentally, allowing a 
trademark licensee to retain its rights is a de facto order of specific 
performance on a trademark owner, but when that owner is a debtor in 
bankruptcy, specific performance should not be available against it. In short, 
Sunbeam should not be given any weight going forward. A licensee should be 
limited to a prepetition claim for damages, only.  
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INTRODUCTION 
Rejection. The overwhelming majority of the time, rejection is not a 
concept that fills a person with hope.1 Most of the time, it conjures up the exact 
opposite, a sense of despair. The exception is a debtor in bankruptcy. Within 
that realm, rejection can mean new life, the essence of hope. For a trademark 
licensor, however, that hope seems to have been quashed by Sunbeam 
Products, Inc. v. Chicago American Manufacturing, LLC.2 Sunbeam has 
already garnered significant attention, and some bankruptcy experts are 
lauding this decision as a welcome step forward in the evolution of bankruptcy. 
Sunbeam first held the Bankruptcy Code (Code) was silent as to trademarks in 
particular, and Congress’s failure to address trademarks was not to be 
interpreted as a codification of an earlier case, Lubrizol Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc.3 It then held that because the Code was silent 
as to trademarks, under nonbankruptcy law a breach by the licensor did not cut 
off the licensee’s rights to continue using the trademark.4 
Sunbeam’s holding flies in the face of established bankruptcy jurisprudence 
and precedent. Prior to Sunbeam, the generally accepted rule had been that 
when a trademark licensor enters bankruptcy and rejects the license as an 
executory contract, the only remedy available to the non-debtor licensee was 
an unsecured prepetition claim against the debtor, as set forth in Lubrizol.5 The 
licensee was not entitled to seek specific performance in the way of retaining 
its rights under the license to continue using the trademark.6 For over twenty-
five years, this was the accepted practice, until Sunbeam. 
Although the holding in Sunbeam is arguably more equitable, especially for 
the licensee, the Sunbeam court itself noted that “[w]hat the [] Code provides, a 
judge cannot override by declaring that enforcement would be inequitable.”7 
That was not what the Seventh Circuit claimed it did, of course. Instead, it held 
that Congress failed to address trademarks within the Code.8 Thus, because the 
Code is silent, nonbankruptcy law will control.9 Even if the court’s first 
                                                          
 1 Imagine if the original Star Wars film was entitled: Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Rejection. 
 2 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 
790 (2012). 
 3 Id. at 375; Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 4 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376–77. 
 5 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 377–78. 
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premise that Congress’s omission means silence and nothing more is correct, 
the Code is anything but silent on executory contracts.10 Sections 365(a) and 
(g) specifically provide that a debtor can reject executory contracts and that 
rejection is treated as a breach of the contract.11 In almost all instances, the sole 
remedy that has actually been granted to the non-rejecting party is an 
unsecured, prepetition claim against the debtor, except where the Code 
provides specific carve-outs to guarantee specific performance for a very 
limited scope of executory contracts.12 Because there is no carve-out for 
trademark licenses,13 even if Sunbeam does not directly contradict the Code, it 
should not be followed by the other circuits, and should be limited to a very 
narrow reading. 
This Comment concedes that the Seventh Circuit sees a significant number 
of chapter 11 cases, and Judge Easterbrook has played a key part in developing 
other areas of bankruptcy law.14 Further, this is not just Judge Easterbrook’s 
opinion, but was decided by a three-judge panel of Seventh Circuit judges.15 
Even further, this opinion was circulated to the entire circuit, and no judges 
favored a hearing en banc, including other well-respected jurists such as 
Richard Posner and Diane Wood.16 This is to point out that this decision is not 
easily dismissed or disregarded, and this Comment does not lightly challenge 
the Seventh Circuit’s reasoning. Nonetheless, this Comment argues that it 
should not be followed. 
                                                          
 10 ELIZABETH WARREN & JAW LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS 525 (6th 
ed. 2009) (“[S]ection 365 is one of the longest and most detailed in the Code.”). 
 11 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a), (g) (2012). 
 12 These are for real property leases, time-shares, and “intellectual property” licenses. See 11 U.S.C. 
§ 365(h), (i), (n). 
 13 This Comment acknowledges that the proposed Innovation Act might include such a carve-out, 
providing the legal backing upon which Sunbeam could have relied, but that legislation has only passed the 
House, still has to go through the Senate, and could quite easily still be changed before passage. See Bob 
Eisenbach, Innovation Act, Passed by the House, Would Make Major Changes to Section 365(n)’s IP Licensee 
Protections, IN THE RED (Dec. 17, 2013), http://bankruptcy.cooley.com/2013/12/articles/business-bankruptcy-
issues/innovation-act-passed-by-the-house-would-make-major-changes-to-section-365ns-ip-licensee-
protections/. 
 14 See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866 (7th Cir. 2004); Randolph v. IMBS, Inc., 368 F.3d 726 (7th Cir. 
2004); Kham & Nate’s Shoes No. 2, Inc. v. First Bank of Whiting, 908 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir. 1990); Levit v. 
Ingersoll Rand Fin. Corp. (In re Deprizio), 874 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1989); Bonded Fin. Servs., Inc. v. 
European Am. Bank, 838 F.2d 890 (7th Cir. 1988); In re Xonics, Inc., 813 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1987); In re TCI 
Ltd., 769 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1985). 
 15 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 374 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. 
Ct. 790 (2012). 
 16 Id. at 378. 
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In Part I, this Comment provides the framework for understanding the 
rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy. That includes an examination of 
the different kinds of intellectual property, especially what makes trademarks 
unique. It also examines the elements and treatment of executory contracts. 
Part II begins with the decision in Lubrizol. Then, it explores the official 
intersection of intellectual property law and the Code, and the trend of cases 
following Lubrizol. In Part III, this Comment begins its analysis of Sunbeam 
and its supporters. Finally, Part IV finishes the analysis of Sunbeam, namely, 
that the Code does not support Sunbeam and that Sunbeam does not even 
support itself. This Comment explains how the difference in trademarks from 
other forms of intellectual property, and the fundamental policies of 
bankruptcy also do not support Sunbeam. This Comment concludes that 
Sunbeam should not be followed going forward. Trademark licensees should 
be limited to a prepetition claim for damages and should not be allowed to 
obtain specific performance post-rejection. 
I. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND EXECUTORY CONTRACTS 
Before beginning substantive analysis of trademark licenses within 
bankruptcy, this Comment lays out the basic principles of two types of legal 
concepts. First, it will provide a basic background on the types of intellectual 
property and explain how trademarks are different. Following that will be a 
brief definition of executory contracts, and finally, the general treatment of 
executory contracts within bankruptcy will be explained. 
A. Intellectual Property Background 
“Intellectual property” is a term often used as a simplistic substitute for a 
complicated body of laws and rights. But, like many things, it is more 
complicated than it seems. Intellectual property encompasses patents, 
copyrights, trademarks,17 and trade secrets.18 In many respects, patents and 
copyrights are fundamentally different from trademarks. The most fundamental 
differences in this context are: (1) the foundation from which these rights arise 
and their societal purpose, (2) the lifetime of those rights, (3) the nature of 
                                                          
 17 For the purposes of this Comment, the term trademark includes trademarks, trade dress, service marks, 
certification marks, collective marks, and all other types of marks generally included within the scope of the 
Lanham Act and common law. 
 18 For the purposes of this Comment, it is unnecessary to explore the foundations of trade secrets or their 
treatment in bankruptcy. 
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what those rights are embodied in, and (4) the quality-control aspects of 
trademarks. 
1. Foundational Support and Purpose 
Federal patent and copyright law is grounded in more direct, explicit 
constitutional support whereas the legal basis for federal trademark is inferred 
from the Commerce Clause, but never explicitly mentioned anywhere in the 
Constitution.19 
Patent and copyright rights have their basis in the Patent and Copyright 
Clause of the Constitution, for the purpose of “promot[ing] the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”20 
Thus, their collective purpose is to encourage scientific and artistic 
development, for the benefit of society.21 To that end, the Constitution grants 
Congress the power to give inventors a limited monopoly of rights as an 
incentive to create,22 which Congress has done through Titles 35 and 17, 
respectively.23 
Alternatively, trademark rights began in the common law, primarily arising 
out of unfair competition and trade practices law. Rights in trademarks were 
not intended to provide an incentive for progress and development.24 Their 
main purposes are to identify the source of goods25 and to protect consumers 
                                                          
 19 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879). 
 20 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
 21 Roger E. Meiners & Robert J. Staaf, Patents, Copyrights, and Trademarks: Property or Monopoly?, 
13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 911, 918 (1990) (“[T]hese services are useful to society. . . . Industrial progress is 
desirable to society. . . . This can best be done by granting exclusive patent rights to the inventor in return for 
public disclosure of his invention.” (citing Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy in the 
Nineteenth Century, 10 J. ECON. HIST. 1, 7–9 (1950))). 
 22 Id. at 913 (“The standard argument for a patent [and copyright] system is that innovators will not have 
sufficient incentive to produce innovations unless they have a monopoly (exclusive) right to the economic 
returns.”). 
 23 See generally 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2012); 35 U.S.C. §§ 1–390 (2012). 
 24 In re Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 93–94 (1879) (“Any attempt, however, to identify the essential 
characteristics of a trade-mark with inventions and discoveries in the arts and sciences, or with the writings of 
authors, will show that the effort is surrounded with insurmountable difficulties.”); see also Sony Corp. of Am. 
v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 439 n.19 (1984) (“We have consistently rejected the proposition 
that a similar kinship [as between patents and copyrights] exists between copyright law and trademark 
law . . . .”). 
 25 Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 92 (“The right to adopt and use a symbol or a device to distinguish the 
goods or property made or sold by the person whose mark it is, to the exclusion of use by all other  
persons . . . .”). 
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by reducing their search costs.26 Currently, trademark protection stems from a 
combination of common law, state statutes, and a federal statute, the Lanham 
Act.27 The Lanham Act draws its Constitutional support from the Commerce 
Clause, not from the Patent and Copyright Clause.28 
2. The Lifetime of IP Rights 
A second essential difference is in the duration of rights and protections. 
Because the protection and monopoly given to patent and copyright owners is 
just a necessary evil to promote progress and culture, those monopolies are 
limited in duration. Patents receive up to twenty years of protection,29 and 
copyrights can range from the life of the author plus 70 years to 120 total 
years.30 Also, at the natural end of patent or copyright protection, the owner is 
still able to take advantage of that patent or copyright, but it can just no longer 
prevent others from using it too.31 
Conversely, trademark rights have no restrictions on duration and can last 
for centuries, even millennia theoretically, so long as various requirements 
within the mark owner’s control are met and maintained, such as use in 
                                                          
 26 Armen Alchian and William Allen, two UCLA economists, posited, 
Brand names and trademarks become associated with expectations of a particular quality. 
Reputations based on consistent past performance economize on the costs of information about 
the anticipated performance of a good. Thus consumers will sensibly use the brand name or 
reputation of the maker as a basis for choice. The greater are the possible losses from poor 
performance of a good, the greater is the value of that brand name as a predictor of quality of 
performance. Without brand names or other means of identifying makers, consumers would face 
larger risks and incur greater costs of information. 
A. ALCHIAN & W.R. ALLEN, EXCHANGE AND PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, COORDINATION, AND CONTROL 193 
(2d ed. 1977). Another school of thought says it was never really about protecting the consumer so much as 
protecting the producer from lost sales. Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1916 (2007). Technically the protections against trademark dilution are to protect 
the brand equity that the owner has in a mark; this Comment would argue that brand equity is protected 
because of the overall value to consumers for mark owners to make that investment in their brand. 
 27 Common law laid the foundation, and then the statutes have strengthened and modernized the 
protections, though have not preempted the common law entirely. See Meiners & Staaf, supra note 21, at 929. 
 28 Trademarks identify the source of goods, and those goods are used in commerce, and therefore the 
support for the regulation of trademarks stems from the Commerce Clause. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. at 
95. 
 29 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012). There are different lengths for the different types of patents, and it 
also varies on other factors, but such a discussion is not relevant for the purposes of this Comment. The 
fundamental concept to grasp is that patent rights are limited in duration. 
 30 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (2012). Just as with patents, the length of time varies for different types and 
classifications of copyrightable material, but such a discussion is not relevant for the purposes of this 
Comment. The fundamental concept to grasp is that copyrights are limited in duration, at least in theory.  
 31 See, e.g., id. 
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commerce and registration renewals.32 Thus, trademark rights and protections, 
unlike patents and copyrights, can continue in perpetuity.33 If a trademark 
owner has granted an exclusive license without an explicit time limit, or has 
granted a naked license essentially transferring complete ownership to the 
licensee, it is conceivable that the trademark owner will never reacquire the 
right to use its own mark. 
3. Physical Object vs. Intangible Goodwill 
A third difference is that some intellectual property rights, especially 
patents and copyrights, are treated as intangible, quasi property rights34 though 
many question whether these rights are actually based in property, contract, or 
other areas.35 With patents and copyrights, however, there is also a physical 
thing, an object, a piece of actual property, in which those rights are based, at 
least in theory.36 With trademarks, there is no physical object, nor does it 
technically protect ideas or concepts; rather, it is the goodwill embodied and 
earned in that idea or concept in which the rights are based.37 Most 
                                                          
 32 The grounds for cancelling the registration of a mark include abandonment by the owner, becoming 
generic, or having been obtained fraudulently. 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012). 
 33 There is the argument that because of the efforts of Disney and others, copyright protection keeps 
being extended, constructively amounting to protection in perpetuity, but according to statute, copyright 
protection is limited in duration. 
 34 The term quasi property comes from a Supreme Court case on copyrights. See Int’l News Serv. v. AP, 
248 U.S. 215, 236 (1918) (“it must be regarded as quasi property . . .”).  
 35 See generally, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View of the Cathedral: The Dominance of Property 
Rules, 106 YALE L.J. 2091 (1997); Michael A. de Gennaro, The “Public Trust” Servitude: Creating A Policy-
Based Paradigm for Copyright Dispute Resolution and Enforcement, 37 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1131, 1171 
(2005); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus 
Problem and the Divisibility of Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. S373, S378–79 (2002); Thomas W. Merrill & Henry 
E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773 (2001); Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an 
Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1998 DUKE L.J. 925 (1988). 
 36 With patents, the “physical object” need not be actually constructed for the creation of rights; those 
rights are still based in the theoretical object as if it had been physically produced. See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., 
Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 66 (1998) (“[I]t does not follow that proof of reduction to practice is necessary in every 
case. . . . [O]ne can prove that an invention is complete and ready for patenting before it has actually been 
reduced to practice.”). 
With copyrights, one core principle is that although copyright protects ideas, those ideas must be 
produced in a fixed medium, and thus technically can be linked to a physical object. See 17 U.S.C. § 102 
(2012). 
 37 Roger E. Meiners and Robert J. Staaf explain how the trademark right is tied to property thusly: 
The property in a trademark lies with its use; it is nothing more than a privilege, valuable because 
of its exclusivity. In adopting it one takes nothing from, and in abandoning it returns nothing to, 
any store of common or public property. It is not an article of commerce in the sense that it may 
be consumed by the purchasing public. It is property only when used to indicate the origin or 
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importantly, the public links that idea or concept with the source of a particular 
good used in commerce. But note that the trademark right applies to that 
concept of earned trust and goodwill, not to the actual idea, nor to that good, 
which would potentially be the subject of copyright or patent rights. 
4. Quality-Control Aspects of Trademarks 
Finally, a fourth core difference, and maybe the most important to this 
debate, between patents, copyrights, and trademarks is the quality-control 
aspect of trademarks that is absent from the others.38 Trademark rights are lost 
if the trademark is deemed to have been abandoned.39 One way in which a 
trademark can be abandoned if the mark’s owner does not continually monitor, 
or at least have the right, the trademark’s use by licensees to ensure that the 
quality of the goods provided under the mark is maintained; a license that fails 
to include quality control provisions is a “naked” one that can result in the loss 
of the licensor’s rights.40 Neither patents nor copyrights have a similar 
monitoring requirement to maintain those rights and protections. 
5. Hypothetical Examples 
The following two hypotheticals illustrate the difference between 
copyrights and patents, and trademarks. For copyrights, imagine that The Walt 
Disney Co. (“Disney”) licensed the broadcast rights of its animated film, Snow 
White,41 to HBO to air for a month. Now, suppose that instead of actually 
                                                                                                                                      
ownership of goods. It is property only in the sense that trade reputation or goodwill is a property 
right. A trademark is merely an instrumentality for the protection of that property right. 
Meiners & Staaf, supra note 21, at 929–30. 
 38 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985) (“National protection of 
trademarks is desirable, Congress concluded, because trademarks foster competition and the maintenance of 
quality by securing to the producer the benefits of good reputation.”). 
 39 15 U.S.C. § 1064(3) (2012) (providing that a trademark may be cancelled if “the registered mark . . . 
has been abandoned.”).  
 40 Eva’s Bridal Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[Licensor] abandoned 
the [trade]mark by engaging in naked licensing. . . . The written agreement did not require [the licensee] to 
operate the [business] in any particular way and did not give the licensor any power of supervision over how 
the business was conducted.”); see also Stanfield v. Osborne Indus., Inc., 52 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 1995) 
(“When a trademark owner engages in naked licensing, without any control over the quality of goods produced 
by the licensee, such a practice is inherently deceptive and constitutes abandonment of any rights to the 
trademark by the licensor.” (quoting First Interstate Bancorp. v. Stenquist, No. C-89-4106, 1990 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 19426, at *7 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted))). 
 41 For the purposes of this hypothetical, assume that Disney still has a copyright in the original version of 
Snow White, despite how long it is has been available to the public. It probably still does, because Disney 
seems to be a master at keeping things out of the public domain, but that is an entirely different subject for a 
different comment.  
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airing Snow White as Disney recorded and provided, HBO instead aired an 
amateur production that was filmed in someone’s basement, as the original 
Disney production. Even if unchallenged, such an act would not cause Disney 
to lose its copyright protection in the original production of Snow White. The 
same would be true regarding patents. If a patent holder licensed the right to 
manufacture its patent, “Product X,” to another party, and that party made 
something else, “Product Y,” but marketed and sold it as “Product X”, the 
patent holder’s rights in “Product X” would not be affected. 
Trademarks are different. Suppose a man named Enzo Ferrari has acquired 
a trademark in the name “Ferrari,” and the reputation that “Ferrari” cars are 
top-of-the-line machines. Enzo has spent 100 years building this brand, and 
that quality is what the consuming public now has learned to expect when it 
purchases a Ferrari. Now, suppose that Enzo decides he does not actually want 
to manufacture his cars anymore, and licenses the use of the name Ferrari to a 
manufacturer in Georgia, but does not have a provision allowing him to inspect 
the quality of the goods being sold under his trademark.42 Unfortunately, that 
manufacturer is unscrupulous, and uses only the cheapest parts, held together 
by glue. The consuming public does not know this, however, and relying on 
the reputation of the name Ferrari, buys these new Ferraris, and all the cars fall 
apart. If Enzo did not retain the right to force his licensee to take corrective 
actions, this would provide a basis for Enzo to actually lose all his trademark 
rights and protections in Ferrari.  
Likewise, let’s say that the Walt Disney Co. has acquired a trademark in 
the name “Disney Co.” associated with producing high quality animated films. 
Then, after decades of producing these high quality films, and building its 
reputation, it licenses the use of the name Disney Co. to a couple who make 
really poor amateur films in their basement. By allowing this couple to produce 
bad movies under the name Disney Co. and not monitoring the quality of those 
films, The Walt Disney Co. would lose its trademark rights in the name Disney 
Co. This is a crucial difference between copyrights and patents, on the one 
hand, and trademarks on the other. 
A lack of Constitutional support, non-property-based rights, quality-control 
requirements, and the duration of those rights all make trademarks 
fundamentally different from patents and copyrights despite all generally being 
grouped together within the category of intellectual property. Regardless of the 
basis for those rights, a trademark owner may license the use of those rights to 
                                                          
 42 I.e., a naked license. 
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others.43 For the purposes of this Comment, courts have considered trademark 
license agreements executory contracts.44 
B. Executory Contracts 
One of the most complicated issues in bankruptcy is how to treat executory 
contracts.45 There is significant disagreement as to what constitutes an 
executory contract, which will be explored below. Ultimately, once a contract 
has been deemed executory, bankruptcy allows the debtor, with the approval of 
the bankruptcy court, to assume or reject it, which raises additional questions. 
1. What Is An Executory Contract? 
To begin, determining what “executory” means is not clear, leading to great 
debate and a split of authority among the circuits.46 There are three generally 
accepted definitions, only one of which is relevant to this Comment. That 
definition, the earliest and most commonly used of the three, comes from 
Professor Vern Countryman in a Minnesota Law Review article.47 Professor 
Countryman defined an executory contract as “a contract under which the 
obligation of both [parties] to the contract are so far unperformed that the 
failure of either to complete performance would constitute a material breach 
excusing the performance of the other” (the “Material Breach Test”).48 This 
was adopted by virtually all courts almost immediately, but has received 
                                                          
 43 See 15 U.S.C. § 1060(a)(1) (allowing assignment of a trademark). 
 44 There is some debate about when trademarks are not executory contracts. Compare In re Exide Techs., 
607 F.3d 957, 964 (3d Cir. 2010), with In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2012). See infra 
Part III.A.  
 45 WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10. 
 46 Compare Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 964, with Interstate Bakeries, 690 F.3d 1069. See infra Part III.A.  
 47 See Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973). 
There are two other definitions of “executory” that have evolved since this definition, commonly referred to as 
the “Some Performance Due Test” and the “Functional Test.” See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 4 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6303 (“Though there is no precise definition of what contracts are 
executory, it generally includes contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.”); 
see generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REV. 227, 
231 (1989) [hereinafter A Functional Analysis]; see also Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy: Understanding Rejection, 59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988) [hereinafter Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy]; Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 1 (1991) [hereinafter Executory Contracts Revisited]. However, since this Comment focuses on 
the remedies available to a licensee after rejection, which assumes it is executory in the first place, the focus 
will be on the Material Breach Test as the basis for determining that a license remains executory, but note that 
this question is the subject of a split of the circuits. Compare Exide Techs., 607 F.3d at 964, with Interstate 
Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069. See infra Part III.A.  
 48 Countryman, supra note 47. 
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criticism in the years since.49 Whenever a debtor is a party to an executory 
contract, the debtor or trustee50 must either assume or reject the contract.51 
2. Assuming or Rejecting an Executory Contract 
It is initially the trustee’s decision to assume or reject an executory 
contract, and that decision is subject to what is called “the business judgment 
rule.”52 The business judgment rule is a general rule applied under corporate 
law, which gives deference to a decision made by a business entity, such as a 
corporation. A court should generally defer to decisions of the company, and 
not substitute the court’s “business judgment” for that of the company.53 
Occasionally, those decisions should be overruled, “to avoid the possibility of 
fraud and to avoid the temptation of self-interest.”54 Courts applying the 
business judgment rule will generally defer to a company’s55 decision unless 
that decision was made in bad faith or constituted a breach of the duty of 
loyalty.56 These are very difficult standards to satisfy, and business judgments 
are rarely overruled.57 
Executory contracts pose both risks and rewards to the debtor, in the form 
of liabilities and assets.58 On the one hand, an executory contract can represent 
a liability to the estate for any performance the debtor owes to the non-debtor 
party, or for any assets that are encumbered by that executory contract, and 
                                                          
 49 A Functional Analysis, supra note 47. 
 50 When filing for bankruptcy under Chapter 11, a trustee may be appointed to manage the debtor’s 
company and/or estate, or the debtor may remain in possession in lieu of an appointed trustee and have all of 
the powers that would have been granted to a trustee. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107–1108 (2012). For the purposes of 
this Comment, trustee is interchangeable with debtor in possession. 
 51 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
 52 NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523 (1984). Bildisco stands for the proposition that the 
traditional test for a decision of a debtor is the business judgment rule, though in that particular case, the court 
adopted a slightly higher standard for rejecting a collective bargaining agreement, which is outside the scope 
of this Comment. Id. 
 53 In general, most of the law around the business judgment rule does not come from the context of 
bankruptcy, and therefore such cases and rules usually refer to directors and board members of corporations, or 
partners in a partnership. However, for the purposes of this Comment as related to bankruptcy, when stating a 
rule, “trustee” will be substituted for the traditional corporate nomenclature, but note that the rules from these 
cases do not use the term trustee.  
 54 Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 27, 62 (Del. 2006). 
 55 Or trustee, in the case of bankruptcy. See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc. 756 F.2d 
1043, 1046–47 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 56 See Brehm, 906 A.2d at 62. 
 57 For a more complete discussion showing that this is a high threshold to meet, see generally DENNIS J. 
BLOCK, NANCY E. BARTON & STEPHEN A. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE 64–94 (4th ed. 1993). 
 58 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ¶ 365.03[2] (Alan N. Resnick and Henry J. Sommer, eds., 16th ed. 
2011). 
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thus not available to the estate.59 On the other hand, it can also represent an 
asset of the estate for any performance owed to the debtor, or assets received 
under it.60 Thus, there are benefits, but also potential risks, from either 
assuming or rejecting it.61 
The decision to reject has a relatively simple standard to meet to satisfy the 
business judgment rule. The rejection must be, in some way, advantageous to 
the estate.62 Because the trustee makes the initial decision, it is within the 
trustee’s discretion to decide if rejection will be advantageous. That decision is 
subject to the business judgment rule, which, as stated above, is a relatively 
difficult standard for a party asking the court to overcome and overrule the 
decision of the trustee.63 
As a general rule, under § 365(g), rejection of an executory contract is 
treated as a breach.64 Although § 365(g) is silent on remedies, § 502(g)(1) 
treats the claim for damages as a prepetition claim, providing that, “[a] claim 
arising from the rejection, under section 365 . . . shall be allowed . . . as if such 
claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition.”65 Even though 
rejection is something that, by definition, occurred post-petition and would not 
otherwise be allowed, § 502 provides this special exception as a way of 
compensating the non-rejecting party.66 But, this also protects the debtor, 
because, by allowing this to be treated as a prepetition claim, § 502(g)(1) 
allows the debt to be discharged like any other prepetition debt in 
bankruptcy.67 Without § 502(g)(1), a claim based on rejection would be treated 
as a postpetition claim, meaning the debt would not be a part of the debtor’s 
estate and not be dischargeable,68 which brings its own problems.69 
Thus, rejection is a powerful tool in the trustee’s belt70 and can be essential 
for serving the two overarching purposes of bankruptcy: by giving the debtor a 
                                                          
 59 See id. 
 60 See id. 
 61 See id. 
 62 Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1047 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 63 See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58. 
 64 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2012)). 
 65 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1). 
 66 See id.; see also Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048; H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 4, at 354 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305. 
 67 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g)(1). 
 68 See id. at § 523(a)(3). 
 69 See 4 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, at ¶ 501.01[d]. 
 70 See A Functional Analysis, supra note 47, at 232. 
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fresh start, 71 and by giving the creditors equal treatment and the greatest value 
for their claims and interests.72 
II. LUBRIZOL AND THE FOLLOWING DECADES 
The Code did not specifically define or address intellectual property until 
after, and in reaction to, Lubrizol.73 This is not to say that bankruptcy cases had 
not involved intellectual property matters before. Simply, Congress had not 
addressed intellectual property in the Code but rather left it up to the common-
law system.74 
A. The Facts of Lubrizol 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit handed down the 
seminal decision on intellectual property license rejections in bankruptcy in 
Lubrizol.75 In August of 1983, a company called Richmond Metal Finishers 
(Richmond) filed for bankruptcy under chapter 11 of the Code.76 Richmond 
was the owner of a patent for a metal-coating-process technology.77 In July of 
1982, thirteen months before it filed for bankruptcy, it had entered into a 
nonexclusive license with Lubrizol Enterprises that granted Lubrizol use of 
Richmond’s patent and trademark.78 
The issue was that after filing for bankruptcy and as debtor in possession 
under § 1107(a) of the Code, Richmond wanted to reject that license pursuant 
                                                          
 71 See Marrama v. Citizens Bank of Mass., 549 U.S. 365, 367 (2007) (“[T]he principal purpose of the [] 
Code is to grant a fresh start to the honest but unfortunate debtor.” (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 
286, 287 (1991))); Hanover Nat’l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 192 (1902); see also United States v. 
Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 203 (1983) (“[T]he assets of the debtor would be more valuable if used in a 
rehabilitated business than if ‘sold for scrap.’ ”); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, at ¶ 1.01[1].  
 72 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966) (quoting In re William Christy, 44 U.S. 292, 292, 312 
(1845)); see also Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 U.S. 151, 161 (1991) (“[Serving] the prime bankruptcy policy of 
equality of distribution among creditors of the debtor.” (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 2, at 177–78 (1977), 
reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6138)); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 58, at ¶ 1.01[1]. 
 73 See Jonathan C. Balfus, Exide Inside Out: New Third Circuit Decision Preserves Trademark 
Licensee’s Rights Following Licensor’s Rejection Under Bankruptcy Code § 365, 31 CAL. BANKR. J. 523, 528 
(2010) (“To counter [the Lubrizol decision], Congress enacted . . . the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy 
Protection Act of 1988 (IPBPA).”).  
 74 See S. REP. No. 100-505, at 2–3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02. 
 75 Mary A. Moy, The Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection Act: An Unbalanced Solution to the 
International Software Licensing Dilemma, 11 U. PA. J. INT’L BUS. L. 151, 155 (1989). 
 76 Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id. 
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to § 365(a).79 Richmond argued that rejecting Lubrizol’s license would 
increase the value of the company.80 Section 365(a) provides, in pertinent part, 
“the trustee, subject to the court’s approval, may assume or reject any 
executory contract or unexpired lease of the debtor.”81 The Code, however, 
does not define executory contract but instead leaves the definition for the 
courts, as discussed earlier.82 Once a court has determined that a contract is 
executory, § 365 allows the court to approve the rejection if it is advantageous 
to the debtor.83 
1. The License in Lubrizol Was Still Executory 
First, the Lubrizol court applied the Material Breach Test and considered 
whether either party had any remaining performance due under the contract.84 
Under the license agreement, Richmond was obligated to give Lubrizol notice 
of any patent infringement suits against it and to indemnify it from such suits.85 
This duty applied during the entire term of the license, and a material breach 
would have occurred if Richmond failed to indemnify Lubrizol even one day 
before the end of the license.86 Therefore, the court determined this obligation 
qualified as substantial performance remaining due by Richmond.87 
Additionally, even though the license was non-exclusive, Richmond was 
still obligated to inform Lubrizol if it licensed the patent to any other entities, 
and, if it did so at a lower royalty rate than Lubrizol was paying, to reduce 
Lubrizol’s rate accordingly.88 Just as the duty to give notice and indemnify 
were duties that ran the length of the contract, this too had a similar lifespan. 
Richmond not notifying Lubrizol of other licenses or lowering the royalty 
accordingly would constitute a material breach.89 Therefore, Richmond still 
owed substantial performance to Lubrizol.90 Thus, it stands to reason that any 
licensor of a license that is exclusive, or is non-exclusive but has a notice and 
                                                          
 79 Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2012).  
 80 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047. 
 81 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). Furthermore, § 1107(a) allows the debtor in possession in a chapter 11 filing all 
the powers and responsibilities granted to a trustee under any other chapter. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a). 
 82 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1045 (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 522 n.6 (1984)). 
 83 Id. (citing Bildisco, 465 U.S. at 523–24). 
 84 Id. at 1045–46. 
 85 Id. at 1045. 
 86 Id. at 1046. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Id. at 1045. 
 89 Id. at 1045–46. 
 90 Id. 
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royalty adjustment requirement, would have substantial performance 
remaining due for the life of the license.91 
Under the Material Breach Test, the court next looked at whether Lubrizol 
still owed any substantial performance.92 The court acknowledged that if 
Lubrizol simply owed a flat-rate royalty, that would not have been enough 
substantial performance remaining.93 However, because Lubrizol used a 
percentage-based royalty scheme and was obligated to provide periodic 
accounting, Lubrizol still owed Richmond substantial performance.94 
Because both Richmond and Lubrizol still had substantial performance 
remaining due the other, the court held that this license agreement was still 
executory.95 
2. An Executory Contract May Be Rejected if Advantageous to the Debtor 
The court next turned to whether the trustee’s decision that rejection would 
benefit the estate would survive judicial scrutiny.96 The court applied the 
business judgment rule to the decision as the correct standard for that 
scrutiny.97 The court placed the burden of proof on Lubrizol, the party 
requesting that the trustee’s decision to reject be overruled.98 Lubrizol 
presented no evidence of bad faith to overcome the business judgment rule.99 
Neither did Lubrizol demonstrate that the rejection was a breach of the duty of 
care by the debtor in possession.100 
Richmond provided evidence that the patent was Richmond’s principal 
asset, that the patent would be the primary source of funds for Richmond’s 
                                                          
 91 The court noted that even if the license is exclusive, the licensor has a duty of forbearance to not sell or 
re-license the property, and that duty of forbearance alone constitutes a remaining substantial performance due. 
Id. 
 92 Id. at 1046. 
 93 Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, pt. 4, at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305). 
 94 See id. 
 95 See id. 
 96 See id. at 1046–47. 
 97 Id. at 1046 (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 523–24 (1984); Grp. of Inst’l Invs. v. 
Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 318 U.S. 523, 550 (1943); Control Data Corp. v. Zelman (In re 
Minges), 602 F.2d 38, 43 (2d Cir. 1979); Carey v. Mobil Oil Corp. (In re Tilco, Inc.), 558 F.2d 1369, 1372–73 
(10th Cir. 1977)). 
 98 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1047; see Brehm v. Eisner (In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig.), 906 A.2d 
27, 66 (Del. 2006). 
 99 See generally Lubrizol, 756 F.2d 1043. 
 100 Id. at 1047. 
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fresh start, and that it would be more valuable unencumbered.101 The 
bankruptcy court held that the decision to reject was a sound business decision 
based on its findings of fact, a conclusion upheld by the Fourth Circuit.102 
3. The Remedy in Lubrizol for Rejection 
At that time, there were no provisions specifically governing the rejection 
of IP licenses in the Code, so the court used the general provision of 
§ 365(g).103 On its face, § 365(g) merely recites that a rejection shall be treated 
as a breach, with no mention of the appropriate remedy.104 The court also 
noted, however, that Congress had addressed certain types of licenses, leases, 
and executory contracts, giving them special treatment with individually 
addressed provisions, along with the guaranteed remedies available.105 Since 
intellectual property licenses did not get such guaranteed remedies, “[t]hey 
share the general hazards created by § 365 for all business entities dealing with 
potential bankrupts . . . .”106 The court recognized that there was a general rule 
that applied to all executory contracts, § 365, and then there was a carve-out 
providing extra remedies to a select few types of executory contracts, and IP 
licenses were not one of those few.107 
Lubrizol argued for specific performance as a remedy, but the court said 
that this would defeat the purpose of § 365(a).108 The court acknowledged that 
there was a provision that explicitly allowed a remedy of specific performance 
for the non-rejecting party, but noted that it was distinctively limited to control 
only the rejection of an unexpired lease of real property.109 However, if any 
non-rejecting party could ask for specific performance as the remedy in any 
situation, then there would be a much more limited purpose in trying to reject 
an executory contract in the first place, rendering § 365(a) and the rejection 
power almost superfluous.110  
In the court’s words, “Lubrizol would be entitled to treat rejection as a 
breach and seek a money damages remedy; however it could not seek to retain 
                                                          
 101 Id. 
 102 In fact, it was reinstated by the Fourth Circuit after being reversed first by the district court. See id. 
 103 Id. at 1048. 
 104 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(g) (2012). 
 105 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 106 Id. 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id. 
 109 Id. (emphasis added). 
 110 See id. 
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its contract rights by specific performance even if that remedy would ordinarily 
be available upon breach of this type of contract.”111 This means that even if 
outside of bankruptcy a non-breaching party would be able to request specific 
performance and retain its rights, within bankruptcy that option is 
foreclosed.112 Thus, the court allowed damages in the form of a prepetition 
claim against the debtor as the only remedy.113 
The court acknowledged that the hardship this might cause the licensee, 
and the potential ramifications it might have on the future of IP licensing as a 
whole, but also felt that under bankruptcy law it was not allowed to act upon 
those types of equitable considerations.114 There are academics and courts that 
have criticized this holding, and said that Lubrizol really missed the boat on 
remedies, but that will be explored further in Part III.D.115 First, Congress’s 
response will be addressed. 
B. Congress Responds to Lubrizol 
In 1988, Congress enacted the Intellectual Property Bankruptcy Protection 
Act (“IPBPA”) as a direct response to the holding in Lubrizol and cases that 
followed it.116 This act added two provisions to the Code: (1) a definition of 
intellectual property and (2) a provision governing the rejection of intellectual 
property licenses.117 Noticeably and intentionally absent from IPBPA is 
anything relating to trademarks.118 
1. Sections 101(35A) and 365(n) Were Added to the Code 
The first addition of IPBPA was the definition of intellectual property at 11 
U.S.C. § 101(35A).119 This definition includes six enumerated types of 
                                                          
 111 Id. (emphasis added). The Sunbeam court and its supporters have argued that a licensee retaining its 
rights is not specific performance because it does not require any affirmative performance obligations of the 
debtor. See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012). However, as 
explained much more extensively below, this argument overlooks the fact that injunctions and duties of 
forbearance are just as much specific performance as affirmative obligations. See infra Part IV.C.3.  
 112 Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 113 Id. 
 114 Id. 
 115 See infra Part III.D.; see also, e.g., Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy, supra note 47, at 916–19. 
 116 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 1–2 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02. 
 117 See generally id. at 8–13. 
 118 See id. at 7. 
 119 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012). At the time, it was actually enacted as § 101(52)–(53) but has since 
been consolidated and re-designated as 35A. Compare S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 7–8 (1988), with 11 U.S.C. 
§ 101(35A). 
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intellectual property that can broadly be categorized as types of patents, 
copyrights, and trade secrets.120 
Section 365(n) was also added to govern the rejection of intellectual 
property licenses.121 Section 365(n) was structured based on two other 
provisions of § 365, specifically § 365(h) and (i).122 Section 365(h)(1)(A)(i) 
provides that upon rejection of a real property lease, a non-rejecting, non-
debtor lessee may elect to consider the contract terminated and receive 
damages.123 If the lessee wants to remain in possession of the leased property, 
however, § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii) guarantees the lessee that right, as a matter of 
law.124 Section 365(h)(2) is very similar, except that it applies to timeshare 
leases as opposed to leases of real property.125 Section 365(i) is virtually 
identical as to the net effect as relates to the sale of real property or a timeshare 
interest if the non-debtor party is already in possession of the property, but the 
contract is still executory.126 
Similarly, § 365(n) provides a licensee with two choices: (1) terminating 
the contract and accepting damages, or (2) retaining its rights under the license 
and essentially receiving guaranteed specific performance to enforce the 
contract, as a matter of law.127 In exchange, the licensee will continue to make 
                                                          
 120 They are: “(A) trade secret; (B) invention, process, design, or plant protected under title 35; (C) patent 
application; (D) plant variety; (E) work of authorship protected under title 17; or (F) mask work protected 
under chapter 9 of title 17.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A). (B), (C), and (D) are patents, and (E) and (F) are 
copyrights. 
 121 Id. § 365(n). 
 122 Compare id., with id. § 365(h)–(i). 
 123 Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)(i). 
 124 Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)(ii). There are some exceptions as to what will be enforced, such as a debtor-
landlord’s duty to make repairs under a real property lease. See id. § 365(h)(1)(B) (stating that the lessee “may 
offset . . . the value of any damage caused by the nonperformance after the date of such rejection, of any 
obligation of the debtor.”). 
 125 Compare id. § 365(h)(1), with id. § 365(h)(2). 
 126 See id. § 365(i). 
 127 Id. § 365(n)(1)(B). There is an alternative argument about the purpose of § 365(h), (i), and (n). Outside 
of bankruptcy, if a party breaches a contract and decides not to perform, the non-breaching party can decide to 
continue performing and sue the breaching party for damages for the breaching party’s non-performance. 
Additionally, if the breaching party owes a continuous duty to perform, and does not do so, the non-breaching 
party can allow the damages to keep accumulating as long as it continues to perform on its obligations. The 
alternative argument about the purpose § 365(h), (i), and (n) is not to guarantee specific performance, but 
rather to cut off the non-rejecting party from claiming the debtor’s continuing non-performance after rejection 
as damages. But this is not entirely accurate, because under § 365(h), after rejection, a landlord-debtor is 
excused from its performance obligations including making repairs, and the tenant cannot make a claim 
against the landlord for damages for the lack of repairs, but the tenant can offset his rent owed to the landlord 
for those damages so that is the functional equivalent, just not in name. See id. § 365(h)(1)(B). Even if that is 
the overall purpose, one effect of these three provisions, nonetheless, is the guarantee of specific performance, 
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royalty payments and will waive any claims for setoff or administrative 
expenses.128 
2. The IPBPA Intentionally Excluded Trademarks 
Congress was worried that the decision in Lubrizol would significantly 
hamper the licensing of intellectual property, just as the Fourth Circuit 
observed.129 In fact, Congress predicted, inaccurately to date, that the decision 
in Lubrizol could end all future intellectual property licensing.130 However, in 
the legislative history behind the enactment of § 365(n), Congress explained 
that it was intentionally excluding trademarks: 
Finally, the bill does not address the rejection of executory 
trademark, trade name, or service mark licenses by debtor-licensors. 
While such rejection is of concern . . . such contracts raise issues 
beyond the scope of this legislation. . . . [T]hese matters could not be 
addressed without more extensive study, [so] it was determined to 
postpone congressional action in this area . . . .131 
In the twenty-six years since 1988, Congress has not officially conducted any 
further studies or addressed trademark license rejection in subsequent 
litigation, despite many courts following the decision in Lubrizol as applied to 
trademark licenses.132 Those courts have treated rejection as limiting the 
remedies available to the licensee to damages only and not allowing specific 
performance.133 
                                                                                                                                      
and that is what this Comment will focus on, regardless of any other potential intended purposes. See Raima 
UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 669–71 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 
2002) (“[Section] 365(n) dictates what happens after rejection. The court has little choice at that point.”) 
(citations omitted). Special thanks to Professor Rafael I. Pardo for pointing out this potential counterargument 
and talking through its nuances.  
 128 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(2)(B)–(C).  
 129 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 3 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3201–02. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. at 5 (emphasis added). 
 132 See infra Part II.C.  
 133 See Rte. 21 Assocs. of Belleville, Inc. v. MHC, Inc., No. 12 Civ. 5361, 2012 WL 6625280 (S.D.N.Y. 
Dec. 19, 2012) (citing Moglia v. Pac. Emp’rs. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 547 F.3d 835, 837 (7th Cir. 2008); see also 
In re Continental Airlines, 125 F.3d 120, 133–36 (3d Cir.1997); Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, 
Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985); In re A.J. Lane & Co., 107 B.R. 435, 439 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1989); 
In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); In re Waldron, 36 B.R. 633, 642 n.4 (Bankr. 
S.D. Fla. 1984)). 
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C. Courts Have Generally Followed Lubrizol as Applied to Trademark 
Licenses 
Lubrizol has continued to be applied to trademark license rejections by 
debtor-licensors, with the sole exception to date being Sunbeam.134 IP licenses 
generally continue to be considered executory contracts.135 The decision to 
reject the license continues to be within the scope of the business judgment 
rule.136 Courts have followed the statement in the legislative history behind the 
IPBPA, interpreting the plain language of § 365(n) to exclude trademark 
licenses137 and holding that trademark licensees are not protected by 
§ 365(n).138 Across the board, the sole remedy granted to the licensee after 
rejection has been a claim for damages, starting with the Southern District of 
New York.139 
1. In re Chipwich, Inc. 
First, a bankruptcy court in the Southern District of New York applied the 
holding in Lubrizol and treated rejection as a claim for damages.140 In that 
case, In re Chipwich, Inc.,141 the court unequivocally held that rejection 
                                                          
 134 See infra Part II.C.  
 135 In re Buildnet, Inc., No. 01-82293, 2002 WL 31103235, at *3 (Bankr. M.D.N.C. Sept. 20, 2002). This 
is a gross simplification; there is a debate and circuit split over executoriness, and whether to apply the 
Material Breach Test, the Some Performance Due Test, or the Functional Test to determine if a trademark 
license is still executory and whether it is even relevant. Compare In re Exide Techs., 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 
2010) (holding that the trademark license was no longer executory), with Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. 
Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding without really questioning that the license was still 
executory), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012), and In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 
2012) (holding that the license was still executory on almost the same facts as Exide). For a further discussion 
of Exide, see infra Part III.A–B.  
 136 Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 561 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1990). 
 137 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 669–70 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); see also Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375; In re Old Carco L.L.C., 406 B.R. 180, 211 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 138 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (allowing the trustee to 
reject the license and cut off the licensee’s ability to continue using the trademark); Centura Software, 281 
B.R. at 669–70; see also In re Davidson Hydrant Technologies, Inc., BR 11-13349-WHD, 2012 WL 987620, 
at *8 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2012); Old Carco, 406 B.R. at 211; In re Exide Techs. (Exide I), 340 B.R. 222, 
249 (Bankr. D. Del. 2006) vacated and remanded by In re Exide Techs. (Exide II), 607 F.3d 957 (3d Cir. 
2010); Blackstone Potato Chip, 109 B.R. at 561–62; In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1985). 
 139 See Chipwich, 54 B.R. at 431; see also Old Carco, 406 B.R. at 211; HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 
513; Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 669–70; Blackstone Potato Chip, 109 B.R. at 561–62. 
 140 Chipwich, 54 B.R. 427. 
 141 Id. 
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“constitutes a breach of the contract and gives the other contracting party a 
claim for damages.”142 The court did not say that rejection “gives . . . an option 
to make a claim for damages,” it just says “gives . . . a claim for damages.”143 
For support, the court cited to § 365(g).144  
The court also quoted Lubrizol, referring to the “general hazards created by 
§ 365.”145 The trademark licensee “will be entitled to treat rejection as a breach 
and will have an allowable claim for damages under 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)(1) and 
§ 502(g).”146 Note again, there was no language that said the licensee would 
have had the option of damages or requesting to retain its rights through 
specific performance.147 The concept that damages is the only remedy available 
is indisputably confirmed in the opinion because the court explicitly noted that 
rejection would prevent the licensee from continuing to use the trademark.148 
2. In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co. 
Next, a Rhode Island bankruptcy court held in In re Blackstone Potato 
Chip Co. that the claims of trademark licensees after rejection can be treated as 
a general unsecured claim.149 The court here also addressed damages as the 
remedy.150 Normally, § 502(g)’s treatment would have meant that the remedy 
for rejection would create an unsecured prepetition claim.151 Based on the 
special facts of this case, however, the court changed that claim into a priority 
administrative expense claim under § 503(b)(1).152  
However, at no point did the court explore the possibility of specific 
performance as a remedy, nor even mention it a single time.153 It is possible 
that the non-rejecting party did not request this. Another possible reason is that 
the court was tacitly acknowledging that a claim for damages was the only 
appropriate remedy and specific performance did not need discussion. 
                                                          
 142 Id. at 429. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 431. 
 146 Id. (emphasis added). 
 147 See generally id. at 429–31. 
 148 Id. at 431 (“[B]y rejecting the two licenses the debtor will deprive [the licensee] of its right to use 
the . . . trademark for its products.”). 
 149 Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 
561–62 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990). 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id.; see also supra Part I.B.2.  
 152 Blackstone Potato Chip, 109 B.R. at 561–62. 
 153 See generally id. 
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3. In re Centura Software Corp. 
Following the Rhode Island bankruptcy court’s decision in Blackstone, the 
Northern District of California decided In re Centura Software Corp.154 Here, 
one of the issues facing the bankruptcy court was whether the rejection of a 
trademark license should be governed by § 365(n).155 When laying out the 
options of how to apply the law, this court followed the cases above and 
unequivocally stated, “If the court determines that § 365(n) does not protect 
[the licensee]’s trademarks rights, [the licensee] will not be able to use [the 
trademarks]. . . . [I]t will be left with but a § 365(g) claim for damages 
resulting from being unable to use the trademarks in its business.”156 The court 
denied the licensee the ability to retain its rights post-rejection if § 365(n) did 
not govern.157 
In its analysis, the court first points out that by its plain language, § 365(n) 
excludes trademarks, so there was no need to do any further analysis.158 If 
more analysis was needed though, the legislative history generally supported 
this interpretation.159 On the other hand, the court recognized that the 
legislative history might suggest that Congress did intend to allow for specific 
performance as a remedy for trademark licenses like the rest of § 365(n). The 
plain language of the statute was clear, nonetheless, and meant that the 
legislative history was superfluous and should be ignored.160 
The licensee tried to use a case, In re Matusalem,161 in which the court 
denied the debtor’s request to reject the contract in question.162 Though never 
explicitly stated in Matusalem, the natural result from denying the rejection 
was to enforce the terms of the contract, effectively granting specific 
performance to the licensee.163 The court in Centura found that distinguishable 
because the rejection was denied on account of the debtor acting in bad faith, 
and thus the entire issue of damages after rejection was never considered 
                                                          
 154 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660 (Bankr. N.D. 
Cal. 2002). 
 155 Id. at 669. 
 156 Id. (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 157 Id. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. at 669–70. 
 160 Id. at 670. 
 161 In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993). 
 162 Id. at 523. 
 163 See generally id. 
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because there was no rejection.164 Centura also found Matusalem 
distinguishable on other grounds which this Comment will explore in more 
depth below.165 
After its analysis, the court in Centura again stated, unambiguously, 
Because § 365(n) is controlling post-rejection and it does not protect 
trademarks, the court holds that [the licensee] cannot retain any 
trademark rights under the rejected [license]. It cannot continue to 
use [the] Trademarks . . . but . . . it is entitled to file an unsecured 
[prepetition] claim for damages.166  
The court recognized that while this is a “harsh holding . . . equitable 
considerations may not be indulged by the courts.”167 
4. In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc. 
A bankruptcy court in the District of Delaware decided to weigh in as well, 
and once again, post-enactment of the IPBPA, the issue of rejection of a 
trademark license was litigated.168 In In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc.,169 the 
court started with the proposition that damages are the only appropriate remedy 
for rejection unless § 365 explicitly provides otherwise.170 It then echoed the 
court in Centura, holding that the plain language of § 365(n) excludes 
trademarks.171 Following Centura, this court held that the licensee was not 
entitled to retain its rights to use the trademarks.172 The licensee was left with a 
damages claim as the sole remedy available.173 
HQ Global was the first to overtly note the irrelevance of the debate over 
termination or breach.174 It is generally undisputed that rejection relieves the 
debtor of its performance obligations.175 The previous courts had framed the 
                                                          
 164 Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 671.  
 165 See infra Part IV.B.2.a.  
 166 Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 673. 
 167 Id. at 673–74 (quoting Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th 
Cir. 1985)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 168 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003). 
 169 Id. 
 170 Id. at 512. 
 171 Id. at 513 (citing Centura Software, 281 B.R. 660). 
 172 Id. 
 173 Id. 
 174 See id. 
 175 Id. (“[T]he familiar maxim that rejection does not terminate or repudiate a contract but simply relieves 
the estate from its obligation to perform.”); see also Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 
372, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
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issue as asking whether allowing the licensee to continue using the trademark 
was a matter of the licensee retaining its rights.176 Rejection was seen as 
terminating those rights of the licensee, not as directly related to any 
performance obligations of the debtor.177  
The court reframed the issue by calling the right to allow the licensee to 
continue the use of the trademark an affirmative obligation of the debtor.178 
The debtor had a performance obligation to allow the licensee to use the 
trademark, and a second performance obligation to refrain from suing the 
licensee for that use.179 Because rejection relieves the debtor from its 
performance obligations, those obligations were excused by rejection.180 
Therefore, it did not matter whether rejection was considered to be a 
termination or a breach, because either way the debtor was excused from its 
obligations of allowing the licensee to use the trademark.181 
5. In re Old Carco, LLC 
After HQ Global, the Southern District of New York returned to the debate 
with its decision in In re Old Carco, LLC.182 Trademark licenses were only a 
minor part of this opinion, addressed in a total of five sentences.183 As was the 
general trend in the cases above, here the court stated that the licensee only 
retains its rights if the Code explicitly allows it.184 Section 365(n) excludes 
trademarks.185 Therefore, the court held that the licensees were not entitled to 
retain their rights to continued use of the trademarks.186 The licensees were left 
with only damages in the form of prepetition claims against the debtor.187 
                                                          
 176 See supra Part II.C.1–3.; see also, generally, Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 
F.2d 1043, 1045 (4th Cir. 1985). 
 177 See Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 674 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 
109 B.R. 557, 561 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Lubrizol, 756 F.2d at 1048. 
 178 HQ Global Holdings, 290 B.R. at 513. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See id. 
 181 See id. 
 182 In re Old Carco L.L.C., 406 B.R. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 183 See id. at 211.  
 184 Id. (citation omitted). 
 185 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2012)). 
 186 Id. 
 187 Id. 
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All of these cases were decided “on the front line,” so to speak, at the 
federal district court or bankruptcy court level, until 2010.188 The Third Circuit 
stepped into the discussion, but then side-stepped out by deciding a case on the 
grounds of the license not being executory.189 
III.  EXIDE II, FOLLOWED BY SUNBEAM, CHALLENGE LUBRIZOL 
Until the Third Circuit’s 2010 opinion in In re Exide Technologies (“Exide 
II”),190 no decision by a United States Court of Appeals challenged Lubrizol in 
the arena of trademark licenses. Even then, Exide II did not challenge Lubrizol 
on the grounds of the remedy of a rejection being a prepetition claim against 
the debtor. It preempted that question by challenging Lubrizol on the test and 
standard used for determining whether a trademark license is an executory 
contract.191 There is a concurrence in Exide II that does address the possibility 
of allowing the licensee to obtain specific performance but was just dicta.192 
Finally, in 2012, Lubrizol was confronted head-on by the Seventh Circuit in 
Sunbeam.193 
A. Some Trademark Licenses Might Not Be Executory 
The Third Circuit held in Exide II that the license could not be rejected 
because it was no longer executory.194 The court reasoned that the material 
obligations had been substantially performed by both parties, reversing the 
bankruptcy court’s decision.195 
The licensee’s rendered performance outweighed its remaining 
performance due by paying the entire purchase price and operating under the 
license for a decade.196 While the debtor had a duty of forbearance not to use 
the mark, the court did not find this to be a substantial performance owed 
because of a grant of an exclusive license to the licensee.197 Even though it was 
an obligation, this was not a material obligation because the court found it was 
                                                          
 188 See supra Part II.C.  
 189 In re Exide Techs. (Exide II), 607 F.3d 957, 963–64 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 190 Id., 607 F.3d 957; see Balfus, supra note 73, at 533–34. 
 191 Exide II, 607 F.3d 957. 
 192 Id. at 965–67 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 193 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 
S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 194 Exide II, 607 F.3d at 964. 
 195 Id. at 963–64. 
 196 Id. at 963. 
 197 Id. at 963–64. 
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not directly related to the purpose of the license, which was to allow the 
licensee to use the trademark and related assets and liabilities.198 Although the 
debtor had included a provision in the license requiring the licensee to observe 
a quality standards provision, the facts showed that the debtor never exercised 
or provided any quality standards to the licensee in the first place.199 Therefore, 
there was no actual obligation.200 Finally, the debtor’s duty to indemnify the 
licensee expired prior to the bankruptcy and thus was fully performed.201 
Because the licensee had substantially performed under the contract, the 
contract was not executory, and could not be rejected.202 Therefore, the 
majority opinion did not address the implications of a rejection, though one 
judge in this case could not remain entirely silent on it.203 
B. Judge Ambro’s Concurrence 
The majority successfully skirted the issue of what rights belong to a 
licensee if a trademark license is rejected as an executory contract in 
bankruptcy.204 In a concurring opinion, however, Judge Ambro did opine about 
those rights.205 
He said that § 365(n) is silent as to trademark licenses, and that this silence 
is not a valid basis for the negative inference that trademark licensees are not 
entitled to retain their rights under the license.206 He also stated that the court 
in Lubrizol mischaracterized the nature of rejection.207 A rejection is not an 
abandonment, rescission, avoidance, or termination and, as such, does not 
terminate the rights of the other party.208 Being just a concurring opinion on a 
                                                          
 198 Id. at 964. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. 
 202 Id. 
 203 See id. at 965–67 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 204 This determination laid the groundwork for what might be considered a different circuit split as to 
when a trademark license is properly categorized as executory. Compare id. at 964 (majority opinion) (holding 
that the trademark license was no longer executory), with In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., 690 F.3d 1069 (8th 
Cir. 2012) (holding that the trademark license was still executory). This Comment will only address what 
happens upon rejection of a trademark license as an executory contract, and will not explore this split. 
 205 Exide II, 607 F.3d at 965 (Ambro, J., concurring). 
 206 Id. at 966. 
 207 Id. at 967. 
 208 Id. 
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question rendered moot by the majority’s holding, Judge Ambro’s concurrence 
was addressed only in academic circles until Sunbeam.209 
C. Sunbeam Challenges Lubrizol 
The licensee won a battle when the Seventh Circuit challenged Lubrizol as 
to trademark licenses in Sunbeam.210 In Sunbeam, the debtor rejected a license 
that contained both patents and trademarks. Neither party contested that the 
licensee could continue using the patent, but the debtor wanted to cut off the 
licensee’s rights to continued use of the trademarks post-rejection.211 Nor did 
either party contest that the license was still executory at the time the debtor 
filed for bankruptcy.212 The only issue was determining the rights of the 
licensee with respect to the trademark license after rejection.213 
First, the court examined § 365(n) and its legislative history.214 Agreeing 
with Judge Ambro, the court determined that the omission of trademarks from 
§§ 101(35A) and 365(n) is just an omission, and that the IPBPA neither 
codifies nor rejects Lubrizol as applied to trademarks.215 The fact that Congress 
has not gone back to address trademarks in the last quarter century is not a de 
facto codification of Lubrizol.216 Rather, trademarks in bankruptcy were just 
suffering from a legislative agenda drought, and the failure to include 
trademark licenses within the scope of § 365(n) should not be interpreted as 
Congress’s tacit approval of a trademark licensee’s rights being cut off.217 The 
idea that § 365(n) is inapplicable conforms with all the cases that have come 
before it.218 
                                                          
 209 See generally, e.g., Balfus, supra note 73. 
 210 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372 (7th Cir. 2012) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. 
denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). This Comment will first lay the groundwork of the opinion in Sunbeam in this 
Part, and then will explore parts of the opinion more thoroughly below in Part IV. 
 211 Id. at 374–75. As an interesting side note, the plaintiff in this action, Sunbeam Products, was not the 
debtor, but a third party who purchased the assets of the debtor after the debtor rejected the license. The issue, 
however, was what the rights of the licensee are after rejection, and whether it is the debtor or a subsequent 
buyer of the asset does not make a difference in the analysis. The court only mentions it to introduce the 
parties, and then the rest of the opinion focused on the rejection.  
 212 Id. at 374. This may be because of the fact that the debtor entered bankruptcy proceedings following 
an involuntary petition filed against it 3 months after the license began. Id. 
 213 Id. at 375. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. (citing In re Exide Techs. (Exide II), 607 F.3d 957, 967 (3d Cir. 2010) (Ambro, J., concurring)). 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 See supra Part II.C.  
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Next, since § 365(n) was moot, the court examined what would have 
happened outside the bankruptcy context.219 This is where the Seventh Circuit 
started to diverge from the other courts. According to the Seventh Circuit, and 
Judge Ambro, upon rejection, the debtor was excused from performing, and 
the non-rejecting party could treat that non-performance as a breach.220 
However, a breach by the rejecting party did not affect the rights of the non-
rejecting party. The non-breaching party could choose either to treat the 
contract as terminated and collect damages, or not to treat the contract as 
terminated and elect to continue under the contract, with the understanding that 
the rejecting party is excused from its performance obligations.221 
Section 365(g) on its face is the vehicle used only to equate rejection with 
breach, not to determine what remedies are available or prohibited.222 Through 
§ 502(g), that breach from non-performance is turned into damages in the form 
of a prepetition claim against the debtor, but it does not affect the rights of the 
non-rejecting party.223 The court gave several examples, including one of a 
debtor-lessor rejecting a lease, to illustrate that the tenant can elect to stay, and 
have a prepetition claim as a substitute for the lessor’s obligation to make 
repairs, but the lessor cannot evict the tenant.224 
Because rejection did not affect the non-rejecting party’s rights, the court 
determined that the licensee was able to continue using the licensed mark even 
after the rejection.225 The bankruptcy court did not decide whether the rejection 
terminated the rights of the licensee, but rather granted the licensee the ability 
to continue using the mark “on equitable grounds.”226 The Seventh Circuit 
affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision to allow the licensee to continue to 
use the trademark per the license, but on different grounds.227 The court 
acknowledged that bankruptcy judges are not allowed to decide an issue on 
                                                          
 219 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376. 
 220 Id. at 376–77. 
 221 See id. at 377 (“It merely frees the estate from the obligation to perform and has absolutely no effect 
upon the contract’s continued existence.” (quoting Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 
(11th Cir. 2007))). 
 222 Id. 
 223 Id. 
 224 Id. This Comment goes into more details about these examples shortly. See infra Part IV.B.2.  
 225 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375. 
 226 Id. (quoting In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfr. Co., 459 B.R. 306, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011)). For 
example, the license provided that if the licensor failed to purchase the goods under the trademark back from 
the licensee, the licensee was allowed to sell those goods on the market and recoup its investment without 
infringing on the licensor’s trademark rights. Lakewood, 459 B.R. at 346–47. 
 227 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377–78. 
ROTH GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:19 PM 
2014] RETAINING THE HOPE THAT REJECTION PROMISES 557 
equitable grounds if their decision contradicts a law.228 According to the 
Seventh Circuit, though, the Code’s silence on remedies for rejection of a 
trademark license means state law governs.229 State law allows a non-
breaching party to retain its rights post-breach if it so elects.230 Accordingly, 
the bankruptcy court’s decision was correct, but only because it was supported 
by nonbankruptcy contract law.231 
D. Initial Reactions to Sunbeam 
This decision quickly shook the foundations of twenty-four years of 
judicial consistency. Courts around the country had been relying on Lubrizol 
with no direct challenges.232 Academics quickly began to question how this 
decision might play out, but the question is, what exactly did Sunbeam hold are 
the remaining rights of the licensee?233 Some say that, at least in the Seventh 
Circuit, trademark licensees will always be able to retain their rights in spite of 
a rejection.234 One commentator has argued that while there are measures that a 
debtor can take that will limit the scope or length of a licensee’s rights, there is 
nothing a debtor can do to completely cut off a licensee’s rights at and through 
rejection.235 But is that really true? Perhaps this is extending Sunbeam beyond 
the scope of what the Seventh Circuit intended. 
                                                          
 228 Id. at 375–76. 
 229 Id. at 377–78. 
 230 Id. at 377. 
 231 Id. at 377–78. Something to point out now that will be questioned below in this Comment is that the 
court recognized that post-rejection, “a debtor is not subject to specific performance,” but the licensee 
retaining its rights is different than an order of specific performance imposed on debtor. Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted) (citation omitted) (holding that rejection “merely frees the estate from the obligation to 
perform and has absolutely no effect upon the contract’s continued existence”). The court does not explain 
how forcing the trademark owner to allow the licensee to use the trademarks is not an order of specific 
performance being imposed on the trademark owner. 
 232 There were some who agreed with Judge Ambro and published law review articles calling for this 
judicial activism. See, e.g., Balfus, supra note 73. 
 233 See Alison Bauer, Rejection Revisited: 7th Circuit Hold Rejection Does Not Terminate Right to Use 
Trademark, 9 NO. 10 WESTLAW J. BANKR. 1 (2012); Ronald Gellert, Sunbeam—Seventh Circuit Decision, 
Where Rejected Trademark Licenses Never Die 7 (Aug. 30, 2012) (American Law Institute – American Bar 
Association C.L.E.); Jay Indyke et al., Circuit’s Bankruptcy Ruling is Big Win for Trademark Licensees, 24 
NO. 10 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2012); Lana Koroleva et al., Seventh Circuit Hands Victory to 
Trademark Licensees, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Sep. 2012, at 52. 
 234 See Bauer, supra note 233, at 4; Todd A. Denys et al., Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chicago Am. Mfg, LLC 
11, 13 (Aug. 30, 2012) (American Law Institute – American Bar Association C.L.E.); Gellert, supra note 233. 
 235 Denys, supra note 234. 
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Others believe it is possible that this has created a split worthy of Supreme 
Court attention, but are not sure exactly what Sunbeam means.236 The Supreme 
Court, however, has recently denied certiorari on Sunbeam, so for the moment 
the split will remain unresolved.237 If the Sunbeam holding is extended, and 
rejection will not cut off a licensee’s rights, there might be an increase in 
trademark owners attempting to sell the mark under § 363, the free and clear 
provision.238 It is unlikely that these attempts will be successful, however, 
because § 363 does not directly apply to licenses.239 
In the Seventh Circuit, at least, most believe that there is nothing a debtor 
can do to cut off a licensee’s rights. But even the Seventh Circuit can 
misinterpret the law. Even if it did not, this Comment will, in the following 
Part, clearly demonstrate that Sunbeam should not be given much precedential 
value. 
IV. THE DEATH OF A DEBTOR’S ABILITY TO REJECT A LICENSE AND 
SUCCESSFULLY CUT OFF A LICENSEE’S RIGHTS BY SUNBEAM IS GREATLY 
EXAGGERATED 
A careful reading of Sunbeam reveals that a licensee’s ability to retain its 
rights is not automatic even under that opinion.240 What the opinion says 
directly is that while bankruptcy will treat rejection as a breach, under 
§ 365(g), that breach does not change any of the rights of the non-breaching 
party.241 The opinion then uses examples to illustrate why the licensee is 
allowed to continue using the trademark.242 By its reasoning from those 
examples, the court granted the licensee the right to continue using the 
trademark.243 
A. The Right Retained Is the Ability to Request Specific Performance 
Under Sunbeam, the right that is being retained is the ability to sue for 
specific performance, not an automatic remedy of specific performance.244 
                                                          
 236 Indyke, supra note 233, at 6. 
 237 See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012) (granting the International 
Trademark Association’s motion to file an amicus brief in support of licensor, and denying certiorari). 
 238 See Bauer, supra note 233, at 4; Gellert, supra note 233, at 10. 
 239 See 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) (2012); see also Gellert, supra note 233, at 10. 
 240 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377–78. 
 241 Id. 
 242 See id. 
 243 See id. at 378. 
 244 See id. at 377–78. 
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Under general contract law principles, specific performance is an equitable 
remedy and is only available if legal remedies are insufficient.245 Granting 
specific performance happens rarely, even if a contract explicitly provides for 
it in the event of a breach.246 The rare occasions when specific performance 
regularly is granted are limited to a few specific circumstances, such as unique 
goods, real property, and if damages would be hard to compute.247 Even when 
parties have shown that the legal remedies are insufficient, courts still have 
refused to order specific performance for a variety of reasons, including 
inadequacy of consideration and the difficulty in supervision.248 
The procedural posture of Sunbeam was that the bankruptcy court granted 
the licensee the right of specific performance “on equitable grounds.”249 The 
licensee prevailed on appeal, and the judgment was affirmed, because the court 
held that outside of bankruptcy the licensee would have been within its power 
to retain its rights as a non-breaching party as a remedy.250 
Since § 365(n) was silent on trademarks, the Code simply did not address 
the situation beyond treating the rejection as a breach, according to a plain 
reading of § 365(g).251 The court stated, “nothing about this process implies 
that any rights of the [non-breaching licensee] have been vaporized.”252 The 
court also cited to an Eleventh Circuit case involving a copyright license, 
which held, “rejection is not the functional equivalent of a rescission, rendering 
void the contract and requiring that the parties be placed back in the positions 
they occupied before the contract was formed.”253 Therefore, the court 
affirmed the bankruptcy judge’s grant of specific performance, based on the 
grounds of non-bankruptcy contract law remedies.254 
                                                          
 245 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 359(1) (1981); see also Alan Schwartz, The Case for 
Specific Performance, 89 YALE L.J. 271, 272 (1979) (“Under current law, courts grant specific performance if 
they perceive that damages will be inadequate compensation. Specific performance is deemed an extraordinary 
remedy, awarded at the court’s discretion.”). 
 246 Schwartz, supra note 245, at 271. 
 247 See id. at 272–73. 
 248 See id. at 273. 
 249 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 375 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Lakewood Eng’g & Mfg Co., 459 B.R. 
306, 345 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2011)). 
 250 See id. at 376. 
 251 See id. at 377–78. 
 252 See id. at 377. 
 253 See id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 
1306 (11th Cir. 2007)). 
 254 See id. at 377–78. 
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B. Sunbeam Goes Too Far and Incorrectly Interprets the Code 
Outside of bankruptcy, the Seventh Circuit is correct about its application 
of contract law, what the result of a rejection would be, and the remedies 
available in such a case. However, bankruptcy has the power to substantively 
change other areas of law, the most significant and obvious being the ability to 
not pay unsecured creditors 100% of the debt owed to them.255 
1. Legislative History and Statutory Interpretation 
Another clear example of a special bankruptcy rule is § 105, which grants a 
bankruptcy judge the wide discretion to “issue any order, process, or judgment 
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”256 
Congress gave bankruptcy judges this very broad grant of discretion because it 
recognized that sometimes bankruptcy calls for special rules that would not be 
available outside of the bankruptcy context.257 
Treatment of executory contracts is another example of an arena of special 
rules inside of bankruptcy.258 An entire section of the Code is devoted solely to 
executory contracts, beginning with the rule that a trustee or debtor may reject 
an executory contract, which is treated as a breach.259 Starting with Lubrizol, 
several courts have pointed to the legislative history behind the enactment of 
§ 365(g) to show that Congress intended that a claim for damages would be the 
sole remedy.260 
a. Section 365(g)’s Legislative History 
The language in the legislative history behind § 365(g) that is often cited to 
says, “[t]he purpose is to treat rejection claim [sic] as prepetition claims.”261 
                                                          
 255 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 363, 365 (2012). 
 256 Id. at § 105(a). 
 257 See John F. Lomax, Jr., Future Electric Utility Bankruptcies: Are They on the Horizon and What Can 
We Learn from Public Service Co. of New Hampshire’s Experience?, 12 BANKR. DEV. J. 535, 573 (1996). 
 258 See 11 U.S.C. § 365. 
 259 Id. § 365(g). 
 260 See Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1048 (4th Cir. 1985); see also 
In re Old Carco L.L.C., 406 B.R. 180, 211 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009); In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 
507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003); Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 
281 B.R. 660, 669–70 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002); Blackstone Potato Chip Co. v. Mr. Popper, Inc. (In re 
Blackstone Potato Chip Co.), 109 B.R. 557, 561–62 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1990); In re Chipwich, Inc., 54 B.R. 427, 
431 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
 261 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305. The full language 
from the legislative history behind § 365(g) does not contradict this:  
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Admittedly absent from the language is exclusionary language like “only” or 
“sole.” The argument can be made that this should only be interpreted to mean 
a claim is treated as a prepetition claim as opposed to a postpetition claim. 
While that is one interpretation of this legislative history, and this Comment 
supports that distinction, there is no rule of interpretation that a sentence can 
have only a single meaning. It can mean the above distinction, plus a limitation 
on remedies to damages. Noticeably absent is any discretionary language like 
“may,” “choice,” or “option.” There is nothing about treating rejection as 
preserving the available nonbankruptcy remedies.262 It actually does the 
opposite. 
Without § 365(g) treating rejection as a breach and § 502(g) treating that 
breach as a prepetition claim, rejection would otherwise just be a postpetition 
breach and thus outside the realm of the bankruptcy estate.263 Sections 365(g) 
and 502(g) change the status quo, and transform the remedy from a 
postpetition claim to a prepetition claim, and on their face do not seem to leave 
it in the court’s discretion.264 The language is worded in the affirmative, “the 
purpose [of § 365(g)] is to treat rejection claim as prepetition claims.”265 
Without something like “if the non-rejecting party elects damages but not if it 
elects to retain its rights,” the plain language supports an interpretation that the 
intention was for damages to be the sole remedy, as many courts have 
interpreted the rejection power over the last few decades, at least in regards to 
trademark licenses.266 But this is not the only path to this conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                      
Subsection (g) defines the time as of which a rejection of an executory contract or unexpired 
lease constitutes a breach of the contract or lease. Generally, the breach is as of the date 
immediately preceding the date of the petition. The purpose is to treat rejection claim [sic] as 
prepetition claims. The remainder of the subsection specifies different times for cases that are 
converted from one chapter to another. The provisions of this subsection are not a substantive 
authorization to breach or reject an assumed contract. Rather, they prescribe the rules for the 
allowance of claims in case an assumed contract is breached, or if a case under [c]hapter 11 in 
which a contract has been assumed is converted to a case under [c]hapter 11 in which a contract 
has been assumed [sic] is converted to a case under [c]hapter 7 in which the contract is rejected.  
Id. (emphasis added). 
 262 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305. 
 263 See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(3). 
 264 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349, 354. 
 265 Id. at 349. 
 266 See supra Part II.C.  
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b. Canons of Statutory Interpretation 
The interpretation that an award of damages is ordinarily the only remedy 
available post-rejection is supported on other grounds. The normal canons and 
doctrines of statutory interpretation and construction also support that 
interpretation. A canon is a general principle or rule that courts will utilize if 
deciding a case based on an ambiguous statute or regulation.267 Canons and 
doctrines can range from “‘clear-statement’ principles [to] background 
understandings.”268 
One such doctrine is expressio unius est exclusio alterius (expressio unius), 
which roughly states that whatever a statute does not specifically include is 
excluded.269 Another is the Whole Act Rule, under which a statute should be 
read holistically; that is, a statute should be read not just piecemeal, one 
provision at a time, but both in light of the rest of the statute and the rest of the 
Code.270 Another doctrine is preemption, which means that a statute will 
override common law in the event of a conflict. A fourth canon, a simple 
reading of the plain language of the statute, can also be revealing.271The fifth 
and final canon this Comment will explore272 is the Superfluous Language 
Canon, which states that statutes should be interpreted so as not to contain 
meaningless words.273 
i. Expressio Unius 
One theory of legal interpretation, expressio unius, is based on the concept 
that if Congress says an idea once, then clearly it knows how to express that 
idea and if it is included in one place and not included in another, that 
                                                          
 267 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405, 
452–53 (1989). 
 268 Id. 
 269 The Latin translates as “the express mention of one thing excludes all others.” 
 270 This refers to both the intratextual and the intertextual arguments. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
PHILLIP P. FRICKEY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 271–72 (2d ed. 
2006). 
 271 See Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation—In the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 800, 807 n.30 (1983). 
 272 At this junction, this Comment will actually only explore these first four canons, and will address the 
Superfluous Language Canon in Part IV below. See infra Part IV.C.4.  
 273 See Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009) (“[A] statute should be construed [to give effect] to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted) (citations omitted). 
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exclusion is purposeful.274 As applied to § 365, expressio unius would go one 
step further than simple rules of logic. Under these rules of logic, stated as  
“if  then” statements, § 365(n)275 would be interpreted as stating that “if the 
license is an intellectual property license, then the licensee is guaranteed the 
defined remedies, such as specific performance.” The negative inference from 
that would be if specific performance or other special remedies are not 
guaranteed, then the license must not be an intellectual property license.276  
But under the doctrine of expressio unius there is an additional inference 
that must be made. Because specific performance is a remedy that is explicitly 
listed for only intellectual property licenses,277 it is excluded as a remedy for 
any other type of executory contract. Expressio unius complements another 
doctrine of statutory interpretation, the Whole Act Rule. 
ii. The Whole Act Rule 
The doctrine of the Whole Act Rule is the premise that each section and 
provision is not drafted in a vacuum, but should be read in the context of the 
entire statutory scheme or act.278 Applying that to the Code, §§ 365(g), (h), (i), 
(n) and 502(g) should be read as one holistic document. That reading supports 
the interpretation that damages are the exclusive remedy for the rejection of 
most executory contracts. 
Reading §§ 365(h), (i), and (n) in light of this rule supports the 
interpretation that the choice of remedies outside of these three contexts is 
limited to only a claim for damages.279 Because these provisions explicitly 
state that the non-rejecting party is not required to treat the contract as 
terminated and receive damages, the implication is that such a party has the 
option, at least, of choosing that if it desires. These are the only provisions 
under which the Code explicitly lists the remedies available to the non-
rejecting party. Read in isolation, they would not appear to have any impact on 
                                                          
 274 See ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 270, at 263 (citing Keene Corp. v. U.S., 508 U.S. 200, 208 
(1993). Worthy of notice is that Easterbrook and Posner, on the Seventh Circuit, employ this canon when 
needed, even though some criticize its reliability. See id. at 263 n.18 (citing In re Am. Reserve Corp., 840 F.2d 
487 (7th Cir. 1988) (Easterbrook, J.)); JUDGE RICHARD POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 
282 (1985)). 
 275 Along with 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)–(i) (2012). 
 276 Technically, this is called a “modus tollens” under those formal rules. 
 277 And real property leases and timeshares. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h)–(i). 
 278 See ESKRIDGE, JR., ET AL., supra note 270.  
 279 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h), (i), (n). 
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any other type of executory contract. But they were written in the context of 
§§ 365(g) and 502(g). 
Admittedly, § 365(g) does not, by itself, either limit remedies or even make 
mention of them; but it provides a necessary middle step. By providing that 
rejection shall be treated as a breach, § 365(g) allows § 502(g) to treat that 
breach as a prepetition claim against the debtor.280 If each was to be read in 
isolation, neither would have much effect, because they rely on each other.281 
A holistic reading of the Code, and especially these provisions, show that 
first, Congress provided a framework for the non-debtor to bring a prepetition 
claim for damages against the debtor for a rejected executory contract.282 Then, 
Congress carved out an extra remedy, guaranteed specific performance, for a 
few special types of executory contracts.283 While these three provisions are 
technically silent on any other type of executory contract, it would be going 
too far to argue that because these three individual provisions do not address 
trademark licenses, the Code does not apply at all to trademark licenses. 
Sections 365(g) and 502(g) still control, and provide that a non-debtor may 
bring a prepetition claim for damages against the debtor.284 Indisputably, 
trademark licenses technically do not qualify for the extra remedy as carved 
out specifically by § 365(n).285 Therefore, the remedy for a trademark licensee 
is limited to only a claim for damages. 
The counterargument can be made that the focus of § 365(n) should be on 
the guarantee, not on the concept of specific performance alone. What is 
excluded under this focus is that, guarantee or not, Congress knew how to 
include specific performance as a remedy in the statute but did not make any 
mention or reference to it in the provisions for most executory contracts.286 In 
fact, § 365(i)(2)(B) goes even beyond simply allowing the licensee to retain its 
                                                          
 280 See id. §§ 365(g) and 502(g). 
 281 See id. 
 282 See id. 
 283 See id. § 365(h), (i), (n). 
 284 Id. §§ 365(g), 502(g). 
 285 See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 375 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 
133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 286 Compare 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(g), 502(g), with § 365(h)–(i), (n). Sections 365(g) and 365(h) were enacted 
at the same time, so it also cannot be argued that including specific performance was something Congress 
thought of after it enacted §§ 365(g) and 502(g). See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349, 355 (1977), reprinted in 
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305. 
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rights, this section imposes an actual affirmative obligation upon the debtor to 
produce and deliver title to the licensee.287  
Congress presumably knew how to draft the statute to include options for 
all non-debtor parties to an executory contract, but all Congress actually 
included for the bulk of executory contracts was the statutory language that 
“the rejection . . . constitutes a breach,”288 and that the purpose of § 365(g) is to 
treat this breach due to rejection as a prepetition claim for monetary damages 
against the debtor.289 The argument that the focus should be on the guarantee 
and not the remedy itself is a red herring. A holistic reading shows that 
Congress knew how to provide for specific performance, and explicitly did so 
for some executory contracts but not others. 
When reading the Code in light of expressio unius and the Whole Act Rule, 
the only remedy available to a trademark licensee after rejection is a 
prepetition claim for damages against the debtor. Because the Code does 
specifically provide a framework for a remedy, the doctrine of preemption 
must then apply. 
iii. Preemption 
Under the doctrine of preemption, if Congress has directly addressed an 
issue, neither state statutes nor common law may supersede that, unless such a 
federal statute or provision is unconstitutional. As demonstrated above, 
Congress has directly spoken as to what should happen upon the rejection of 
all types of executory contracts, not just certain ones. Therefore, in the arena of 
a rejection of an executory contract of any type, the state statutory or common 
law remedies are irrelevant. Therefore, on the basis of preemption, the Seventh 
Circuit exceeded its authority in applying common law remedies in Sunbeam. 
Even beyond these formal or semi-formal canons and doctrines, the plain 
language of the statute and rules of logic also support this Comment’s 
argument. 
iv. Plain Language 
The Seventh Circuit is not alone in this interpretation on the effect of 
rejection; many bankruptcy practitioners and academics across the board 
                                                          
 287 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(i)(2)(B).  
 288 Id. § 365(g). 
 289 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349. 
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believe exactly as it does.290 However, another mistake made by many is in the 
dispute over terminology—the difference between termination and breach.  
The common argument is that § 365(g) uses the term “breach” and not 
“termination” to describe what is happening to the contract.291 The proponents 
of the Sunbeam position uniformly declare that rejection is not a termination. 
But, §§ 365(e), (h), (i), and (n) all use the word “terminated.”292 Section 365(e) 
provides that an executory contract “may not be terminated” because another 
party to that contract becomes insolvent, files for bankruptcy, or has a trustee 
appointed before bankruptcy.293 While this relates to the non-debtor party 
attempting to terminate the contract, and not the debtor attempting to reject it, 
this does still seem to imply that an executory contract may be terminated in 
other ways or situations; otherwise why say that it may not be terminated in 
one of these scenarios? Similarly, § 365(h) provides that the non-debtor “may 
treat such lease as terminated.”294 Section 365(i) provides that the non-debtor 
“may treat such contract as terminated.”295 Section 365(n) provides that the 
licensee may “treat such contract as terminated.”296 The plain language of the 
statute clearly shows that Congress did contemplate and believe that rejection 
has “termination” power. 
Legislative history and rules of statutory interpretation do not provide the 
sole support for the position that a licensee’s sole remedy is damages. Sunbeam 
should not be followed because the three examples the court uses to support its 
grant of specific performance do not actually apply to trademark license 
rejections in Bankruptcy. 
2. The Three Examples Used in Sunbeam Do Not Support Its Holding 
If you imagine the three examples that the court uses to support its grant of 
specific performance to the licensee as legs of a tripod, none of those three 
“legs” are able to bear the weight of that holding, and the “tripod” collapses. 
                                                          
 290 See Balfus, supra note 73; A Functional Analysis, supra note 47; see generally Executory Contracts in 
Bankruptcy, supra note 47; Executory Contracts Revisited, supra note 47. 
 291 Executory Contracts Revisited, supra note 47, at 8 (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[R]ejection is 
not some mystical power to cause contracts to vanish, nor a power to terminate, cancel, or repudiate them.”); 
see also Balfus, supra note 73, at 534 (stating that rejection does not have avoidance, rescission, or termination 
power); A Functional Analysis, supra note 47, at 239 (rejection is not an avoidance power). 
 292 11 U.S.C. § 365(e), (h)–(i), (n). 
 293 Id. § 365(e)(1). 
 294 Id. § 365(h)(1)(A)(i). 
 295 Id. § 365(i)(1). 
 296 Id. § 365(n)(1)(A). 
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The first example the court used was the common law rights that would be 
available for any ordinary breach of the license.297 The second example was 
based on a non-debtor tenant leasing real property from a debtor-landlord. The 
third example was based on a copyright license case, Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe 
Records, Inc.298 For the following reasons, none of them is technically 
applicable in the context of executory trademark licenses in bankruptcy. 
a. Common Law Remedies 
The first example is the court’s illustration involving the debtor’s 
obligation to provide patented parts essential for the finished, patented product 
licensed to the licensee, and the debtor’s obligation to pay for the completed 
products.299 The court then hypothesized that the debtor had failed to provide 
those parts, thereby breaching the contract.300 The licensee would be able to 
buy the required parts from a competitor and then sue the debtor for 
reimbursement under substitution principles of contract law, and the debtor 
could not prevent that or the continued sale of the completed products.301 
However, patents are covered in one of the specific carve-outs from the 
limitation on remedies granted by Congress to non-rejecting parties.302 
When enacting the IPBPA, Congress said that patents are different from 
trademarks, and it specifically amended the Code to include § 365(n) to protect 
patents and to prevent a rejection from ending the rights of a licensee to 
continue using the licensed patent.303 Since Congress has specifically said that 
§ 365(n) applies to patents and does not apply to trademarks, the use of an 
example based on a patent license is therefore inapplicable in the context of 
trademark licenses.304 
This example is admittedly ambiguous and open to some interpretation. A 
counterargument would be that, as drafted, the point that can be inferred even 
though not explicitly stated was the licensee’s ability to sell the patented 
products under the trademark. Unfortunately, the example confusingly goes 
                                                          
 297 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 376–77 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 
S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 298 Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294 (11th Cir. 2007). 
 299 See Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376–77. The completed product was a box fan, and the part in question was 
the motor for the fans. Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See id. at 377. 
 302 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012). 
 303 See S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5, 7 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204. 
 304 See id. 
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back and forth between discussing this as a patent or trademark issue. The 
example starts with, “[s]uppose [the debtor failed] to provide the motors. . . . 
[The licensee] could have covered in the market by purchasing motors and 
billed [the debtor] for the extra cost.”305 This clearly relates to the patent (the 
motors and the fans) and not the trademark, not to mention that the end result 
is a monetary damages claim against the debtor. The next sentence does 
mention the licensee “bargained for the security of being able to sell 
[trademark]-branded fans.”306 That obviously invokes trademarks, but does it 
mean that he can sell the fans under the brand, or that the licensee negotiated 
for the monetary value of that by being able to sell the fans unbranded and then 
recover the difference as a damages claim? At a minimum, it is ambiguous. 
This ambiguity is not cleared up in the next sentence either, which just 
mentions that outside of bankruptcy, the licensor could not stop the licensee 
from selling the fans, but again there is no reference to the trademark or the 
fans being branded.307 This question of whether Judge Easterbrook meant to 
refer only to the patented material or both that and the trademark may seem 
like a small, insignificant point, a distinction without a difference. But because 
of the protection that § 365(n) provides to patents but not to trademarks, this 
distinction makes an indisputable difference. Furthermore, other courts have 
noted this type of difference before.308 
As introduced above in Part I.C.3, in Matusalem, a bankruptcy court in the 
Southern District of Florida held that a trademark license could not be 
rejected.309 In Matusalem, the license at issue included both a trademark and a 
trade secret.310 Instantly, the court recognized that regarding the trade secret, 
§ 365(n) clearly protected it.311 Moving on to the trademark portion of the 
license, the court denied the debtor’s attempt to reject the license.312 This is 
one of the relatively rare instances in which the business judgment rule was 
overcome, and the court overruled the action of the debtor.313 
                                                          
 305 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 376–77. 
 306 Id. 
 307 Id. at 377. 
 308 See In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 515 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993); Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software 
Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 672 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002).  
 309 Matusalem, 158 B.R. at 521–23; see supra Part II.C.3.  
 310 Matusalem, 158 B.R. at 515. 
 311 Id. 
 312 Id. at 522. 
 313 Id. 
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The rejection was denied because, based on its findings of facts, not only 
was there no benefit to the estate from rejection, it would subject the debtor to 
another claim, deepening its debt.314 The result was that instead of rejecting the 
license, the debtor was forced to assume it.315 The effect is that while the 
licensee was able to retain its rights as to both the trade secret and the 
trademark, those holdings were on different grounds.316 What is important 
about the two independent justifications is that while the licensee would have 
been granted specific performance as to the trade secret even if the rejection 
was valid, the licensee was able to continue using the trademark because the 
debtor was forced to assume the contract.317 It was not because specific 
performance was a valid remedy after rejection of a trademark license. 
Nearly a decade later, the licensee in Centura unsuccessfully argued that 
the holding in Matusalem meant that even if the trademark license were 
rejected, the licensee would still be able to retain its rights.318 Unfooled by this 
attempt, the court in Centura recognized the distinction that the trademark 
license was not rejected in Matusalem¸ nor was any suggestion made that 
§ 365(n) should extend to trademarks.319 Instead, the court in Centura observed 
that Matusalem held that the licensee would be able to retain its rights as to the 
trade secret despite rejection.320 As to the trademarks, Matusalem “did not 
mention that the licensee could retain any rights. In fact, later, [Matusalem] 
even stated that the rejection would make the Debtor potentially liable for a 
rejection claim, implying that the licensee would be entitled to file a breach 
claim for losing its trademark rights.”321 
In Centura, the attempt to use intellectual property protected by § 365(n) to 
justify granting specific performance to a trademark licensee was 
fundamentally meritless.322 Similarly, the use of a patent in the first example of 
the Sunbeam opinion is comparable to the licensee’s attempted use of a trade 
secret in Centura. Thus, whether the court meant for the example to be about 
the patent or the trademark is important, and the way it was drafted was 
                                                          
 314 Id. 
 315 See id. 
 316 See generally id. 
 317 See id. at 522. 
 318 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 672 (Bankr. 
N.D. Cal. 2002). 
 319 Centura Software, 281 B.R. at 671–72. 
 320 Id. at 672. 
 321 Id. at 672–73 (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). 
 322 See id. at 672. 
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ambiguous. If the court intended to illustrate the remedies available to a patent 
licensee, then its reasoning is just as inapplicable to its own holding as the 
reasoning in Matusalem was inapplicable in Centura. The other two legs of the 
Sunbeam tripod are even shakier than the first. 
b. Leases of Real Property 
The second “leg” the court used to support its “tripod” was a comparison of 
rejection of a license to the rejection of a tenant’s lease.323 This is another 
comparison that does not actually support the Seventh Circuit. Even before 
Lubrizol, Congress had granted a carve-out for rejections of a tenant’s lease.324 
This is another area that Congress specifically addressed and said was different 
from the rejection of all other executory contracts and warranted special 
treatment.325 This is the same unsuccessful argument attempted by the licensee 
in Centura, when it cited to Matusalem, except as applied to executory 
contracts protected by § 365(h) instead of § 365(n).326 Therefore, the use of a 
rejection of a tenant’s lease to illustrate why a licensee of a trademark retains 
its rights to continue using the trademark after rejection has no weight. 
c. Thompkins 
The third and final “leg” that the court relied on was the Eleventh Circuit 
decision in Thompkins.327 Thompkins involved the rejection of a copyright 
license that the court denied because it was no longer “executory.”328 In dicta, 
the court also defined rejection as different from both rescission and the 
avoidance powers of bankruptcy.329 However, just as the first two legs proved 
unsturdy, neither can this leg bear the weight of holding up Sunbeam. 
The analysis in Thompkins is just as inapplicable as the other two pieces of 
support used for the following two reasons.330 To begin, copyrights are 
                                                          
 323 See Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 
133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 324 See 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (2012). 
 325 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305. 
 326 See supra Part IV.B.2.a. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(h) (protecting tenants’ interests in real property 
leases), with id. § 365(n) (protecting licensees interests in patent, copyright and trade secret licenses). 
 327 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (citing Thompkins v. Lil’ Joe Records, Inc., 476 F.3d 1294, 1306 (11th Cir. 
2007)), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 328 Thompkins, 476 F.3d at 1308 (holding that this was actually a sale, not a license and that other than an 
obligation to pay royalties “[t]he transfer of the copyrights was fully executed . . . .”). 
 329 Id. at 1312. 
 330 Technically, the posture of the parties is different as well—it was the licensee who was the debtor and 
rejected the contract, not the IP owner as was the situation in Sunbeam and all the other cases mentioned in this 
ROTH GALLEYSPROOFS2 8/7/2014 12:19 PM 
2014] RETAINING THE HOPE THAT REJECTION PROMISES 571 
protected by § 365(n).331 Quite simply, for the same reason that using patents 
or real property leases is inapplicable above, any reference to protection or 
rights granted to a copyright licensee is inapposite.332 
The second reason the analysis from this case does not apply is that in 
Thompkins the court held that the contract at issue was not really a license so 
much as it was a complete sale of the asset in question.333 Further, this was a 
completed sale, leaving the IP owner “not even so much as a contingent 
interest in the copyrights.”334 Due to its completion, the disputed contract was 
no longer “executory” because there was no substantial performance remaining 
due.335 To support this, the court cited to several cases that treated already-
performed obligations differently from any remaining performance owed, in 
the context of rejection of an executory contract.336 The net effect was that the 
contract was not executory, and it could not be rejected, the court labeling it a 
rejection notwithstanding.337 Any remedies granted in Thompkins were not 
remedies from a valid rejection, just as Matusalem did not involve a valid 
rejection either.338 Thompkins has no real bearing on the issue of the rejection 
of a trademark license, for the same reason Centura gave no credence to 
Matusalem. 
Therefore, the Thompkins court’s definition of rejection should be taken in 
the context of the sale of a copyright, with substantial performance already 
completed and a contract that was not rejectable.339 Because of this crucial 
difference in the contract’s status, the Sunbeam court inappropriately gave 
Thompkins weight regarding a trademark license that remains executory. 
                                                                                                                                      
Comment, though that seems to be a distinction without a difference for the relevant analysis here. See 
generally id. 
 331 11 U.S.C. § 365(n). 
 332 See supra Part IV.B.2.a–b. 
 333 Thompkins, 476 F.3d at 1308. 
 334 Id. What is a little confusing is that the court also said that when the licensee rejected the contract, it 
was relieved of its obligation to continue paying the IP owner royalties, which does seem to imply that the IP 
owner did have some shred of interest remaining prior to rejection. See id. at 1313 (“[U]pon its rejection of the 
contract, [the licensee] was no longer obliged to pay royalties.”). But see Lubrizol Enters. v. Richmond Metal 
Finishers, Inc., 756 F.2d 1043, 1046 (4th Cir. 1985) (acknowledging that if the only performance remaining 
due was an obligation to pay a royalty, the contract was no longer executory and citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, 
at 349 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6305). 
 335 Thompkins, 476 F.3d at 1308. 
 336 Id. at 1307–08. 
 337 See id. 
 338 Compare id. (holding that this was really a fully completed sale and not a license and thus no longer 
executory), with In re Matusalem, 158 B.R. 514, 522–23 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1993) (holding that the parties had 
substantially performed and that the license was no longer executory).  
 339 See Thompkins, 476 F.3d at 1308. 
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Simply, the Seventh Circuit strayed beyond the bounds of the Code and 
overreached in allowing the licensee to retain the rights to use the trademark 
despite the rejection of the license by the trustee. The court’s examples of a 
breach of the patent aspects of the license, the comparison to the rejection of a 
tenant’s lease, and the use of a definition coming from Thompkins are 
inapplicable given that Congress directly addressed executory contracts as a 
whole and created carve-outs for very specific categories of those contracts. 
The use of these three examples only makes Centura all the more applicable, 
that using an example of a patent, copyright or trade secret license explicitly 
protected by § 365(n) is meaningless in the current context of rejection of a 
trademark license.340 Even going beyond the legislative history, statutory 
interpretation, and the invalidity of the examples Sunbeam used to justify its 
holding, there is other support for the position that a prepetition claim for 
damages is the sole remedy available after rejection of a trademark license. 
C. Other Reasons Why Trademark Licensees Should Not Retain Rights After 
Rejection 
There are four other reasons why the rejected trademark licenses should 
only leave the licensee with a prepetition general unsecured claim. First, the 
fundamental differences between trademarks and other kinds of intellectual 
property warrant different treatment for the rejection of that license in 
bankruptcy. Second, the two general policies underlying bankruptcy support 
such treatment. Third, specific performance is already a rarely awarded remedy 
and should not be granted in this situation. Finally, following the line of 
reasoning in Sunbeam to its logical conclusion could make the rejection power 
meaningless. 
1. Trademarks Warrant Treatment Different from Other Intellectual 
Property 
Several of the differences between trademarks and the other two main types 
of intellectual property, patents and copyrights, have a direct bearing on the 
rejection of a license in bankruptcy. Patents and copyrights have a limited 
duration of rights, but trademarks can last forever.341 Perhaps most 
                                                          
 340 Raima UK Ltd. v. Centura Software Corp. (In re Centura Software Corp.), 281 B.R. 660, 672–73 
(Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (holding the fact that a licensee could use § 365(n) to continue using one type of 
intellectual property despite rejection did not mean that the licensee could continue using a trademark). 
 341 Compare 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (lasting approximately twenty years for most patents), and 17 
U.S.C. §§ 301–305 (2012) (lasting 120 years or the life of the author plus 70 years), with 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–
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importantly, because of the nature of trademarks as a source identifier, the 
license of a trademark has a quality-control aspect that copyright and patent 
licenses do not require as a matter of law.342 
The inescapable result of the temporal limitations of patents and copyrights 
is that a patent license or copyright license also has a natural and inevitable 
termination.343 Trademarks, on the other hand, can last in perpetuity and a 
trademark license can therefore also last endlessly. A debtor who has licensed 
a patent or copyright does not need to rely on a rejection power to terminate a 
license, but, in planning for its fresh start, can take into account the inevitable 
end of that license agreement and the return of any remaining assets.344 In 
contrast, a debtor who has licensed a trademark may not be able to get relief 
from that license, and if the terms of that license played a role in causing the 
insolvency, or can significantly help the debtor with his fresh start, it would not 
matter, because the debtor would be at the mercy of the licensee. The unending 
quality of some trademark licenses, such as exclusive licenses, could put the 
fresh start for those debtors in jeopardy and justifies special treatment of 
trademark licenses in bankruptcy. 
Similarly, the quality-control aspects of trademarks make them unique and 
provide an extra justification for why the rejection of a trademark license 
should be treated differently than the rejection of a patent or copyright license. 
Trademark licenses without quality-control provisions are called “naked 
licenses.” A naked license is grounds for a determination that the trademark 
has been abandoned, and the trademark owner loses all rights in it.345 The 
                                                                                                                                      
1141n (2012) (not imposing any expiration of rights so long as other criteria are met such as constant use in 
commerce). 
 342 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985); see supra Part I.A.4.  
 343 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 301–305; 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2). 
 344 Even if a copyright or patent protection expires, this only means that the owner cannot prevent others 
from using that copyright or patent, but is not itself deprived of any use. 
 345 Even Judge Easterbrook and the Seventh Circuit, just one year prior to Sunbeam, held that providing a 
license without a quality control provision is a naked license and is grounds for abandonment. See Eva’s Bridal 
Ltd. v. Halanick Enters., 639 F.3d 788, 789–90 (7th Cir. 2011) (Easterbrook, C.J.) (“[Licensor] abandoned the 
[trade]mark by engaging in naked licensing . . . .”); see also 3 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 18:42 (4th ed.) (“A trademark carries with it a message that the trademark owner is controlling 
the nature and quality of the goods or services sold under the mark.”). Based on this principle, the courts have 
established the rule of law that because the public relies on a particular known quality or reputation of a brand, 
failure to police that quality translates as a false message that the goods sold under that brand are genuine. See 
Shell Oil Co. v. Commercial Petroleum, Inc., 928 F.2d 104, 108, (4th Cir. 1991).  
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trademark owner must retain the ability to control that quality.346 By being in 
control of the reputation of the brand, consumers are protected.347 
Under the court’s reasoning in Sunbeam, rejection would only serve to free 
the estate from its performance obligations without cutting off the rights of the 
licensee.348 This would cut off the estate’s obligation of quality control, leading 
to the trademark being abandoned. The loss of a valuable asset like a 
trademark could pose an undue burden on the estate and hinder or maybe even 
prevent entirely the debtor’s ability to successfully reorganize or pay back its 
creditors. 
Michael T. Andrew disregarded the idea that rejection is a limitation on 
remedies to only damages on the ground that when Congress addressed 
executory contracts, it too had disregarded that idea.349 However, his argument 
was formed in 1991, partly based on the legislative history of the IPBPA, and 
does not reflect twenty-plus years of jurisprudence.350 
After twenty-plus years, this interpretation has to be reevaluated. Congress 
explicitly stated that it acknowledged that the IPBPA would not apply to 
trademarks; it was aware that Lubrizol would continue to remain in effect and 
could likely be used as support for rejection cutting off trademark licensee’s 
rights going forward.351 It is well established that it is almost impossible to 
draw an inference from Congressional inaction.352  
It is possible, of course, that Congress did further study and concluded that 
because trademarks are different, § 365(n) will not be extended to cover them, 
but never published those findings. In that case, silence should not be 
                                                          
 346 See El Greco Leather Prods. Co. v. Shoe World, Inc., 806 F.2d 392, 395 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 347 See id. at 397. 
 348 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377–78 (7th Cir. 2012) (citations 
omitted), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). 
 349 Executory Contracts Revisited, supra note 47, at 11 (“Avoiding-power rejection is . . . simply more 
freight than negative inference will bear. It requires that ‘rejection’ be assigned a meaning fundamentally at 
odds with both the history and purpose of executory contracts doctrine, with no legislative history in support. It 
requires a corresponding abatement of the general principle, explicit in the statute and its legislative history, 
that a bankruptcy estate succeeds only to the debtor’s rights and interests in property.” (quoting Executory 
Contracts in Bankruptcy, supra note 47, at 929)). 
 350 Id. 
 351 S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3200, 3204 (citations omitted) 
(“Finally, the bill does not address the rejection of executory trademark, trade name or service mark licenses 
by debtor-licensors. While such rejection is of concern because of the interpretation of [§] 365 by the Lubrizol 
court and others, [e.g. Chipwich], such contracts raise issues beyond the scope of this legislation.”). 
 352 See Girouard v. U.S., 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946) (“It is at best treacherous to find in Congressional silence 
alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law.”). 
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interpreted as inaction, but rather an indication of attempted action through 
silence.  
However, as Yoda said, “Do. Or do not. There is no try.”353 Without any 
evidence of such findings, it would be hard to say that Congress’s silence is an 
explicit codification of Lubrizol. What is not hard to say, however, is that 
Congress decided not to apply § 365(n) to trademarks, even knowing that 
Lubrizol could and probably would be applied going forward, and that courts 
would treat rejection of a trademark license as a termination with the only 
remedy being a damages claim. Whatever the reasons for its inaction, Congress 
expressly acknowledged its awareness that this could happen and nevertheless 
decided not to act.354 
In conclusion, because trademarks are different from copyrights and 
patents, trademark licenses deserve different treatment upon rejection in 
bankruptcy. 
2. The General Policies Underlying Bankruptcy 
There are two main policy grounds on which bankruptcy rests: maximizing 
the pool of resources available for the creditors and enabling the debtor to have 
a fresh start. Both of these support treating the rejection of a trademark license 
as a termination. 
a. Returning a Valuable Asset to the Estate for Distribution 
In the modern world, it is indisputable that the actual trademarks 
themselves are assets of businesses and individuals, and have their own 
intrinsic value beyond the actual goods or services sold under the mark. 
Outside of bankruptcy, changes in the market value of an asset alone are not 
grounds to terminate an agreement unless explicitly provided for in the 
agreement. Inside bankruptcy, though, the Code provides for exactly this sort 
of treatment by a debtor regarding its assets.355 Thus, if a rejection of a 
                                                          
 353 STAR WARS: EPISODE V – THE EMPIRE STRIKES BACK (Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, 
1980).  
 354 For the full paragraph of this section of the legislative history, which also explained some of the 
reasons why action was being postponed, see S. REP. NO. 100-505, at 5. Regardless of those reasons, the fact 
remains that Congress did not act even though it knew that Lubrizol could continue to be applied to 
trademarks. 
 355 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 363, 365 (2012); see also WARREN & WESTBROOK, supra note 10, at 523–24, 
problem 26.1 (demonstrating that this concept is prevalent and fundamental enough to be taught to law 
students in an introductory bankruptcy class). 
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trademark license would terminate it, then the trustee could potentially secure a 
new license for greater value or be able to sell the trademark as an 
unencumbered asset. That would increase the available pool of resources for 
creditors, serving one of the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy. 
The Code allows for this latter option in all encumbrances other than 
licenses. Under § 363 of the Code, an asset that is subject to a lien or other 
security interest may be unencumbered for the purposes of achieving the 
highest liquidation value for that asset upon sale.356 However, none of the 
scenarios in which a trustee can invoke this power apply to a trademark 
license.357 The free and clear power of § 363 is one that is used often and to 
great advantage, both to the estate and to the creditors.358 Under the reasoning 
in Sunbeam, a trademark license remains an anomalous encumbrance that is 
truly unavoidable. That is one more reason why Sunbeam should be ignored. 
The rejection power should continue to provide an avenue for adding one more 
valuable asset back into the estate for the benefit of the creditors, thus serving 
one of the essential purposes of bankruptcy. 
Inside of bankruptcy, courts are even more reluctant to grant specific 
performance than they are outside of bankruptcy.359 Jay Westbrook, one of the 
leading advocates against treating rejection as a termination or avoidance 
power,360 admitted that bankruptcy limits remedies available against a debtor 
in ways that would not be limited outside of bankruptcy.361 Sunbeam explicitly 
admitted this, too.362 There is a strong policy reason why bankruptcy changes 
the rules regarding specific performance: giving specific performance would 
unfairly reward one unsecured creditor with a payment-in-full when the other 
unsecured creditors would not get full repayment.363 This disparity directly 
                                                          
 356 See 11 U.S.C. § 363. 
 357 See id. § 363(f). 
 358 See generally Alla Raykin, Section 363 Sales: Mooting Due Process, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 91 
(2012).  
 359 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Commission’s Recommendations Concerning the Treatment of 
Bankruptcy Contracts, 5 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 463, 471–72 (1997) [hereinafter The Commission’s 
Recommendations]. 
 360 See generally id.; A Functional Analysis, supra note 47. 
 361 See The Commission’s Recommendations, supra note 359; see also Countryman, supra note 47, at 
465–66. 
 362 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012) (“After rejecting a 
contract, a debtor is not subject to an order of specific performance.”), cert. denied 133 S. Ct. 790 (2012). As 
mentioned earlier, the Seventh Circuit sidestepped their own statement by characterizing the licensee’s 
continued use of the trademark as the licensee electing to retain its rights rather than an order of specific 
performance on the debtor. Id. This seems jenky, and will be addressed shortly. 
 363 The Commission’s Recommendations, supra note 359. 
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contradicts one of the fundamental principles of bankruptcy, namely the equal 
treatment of creditors. The Code has numerous provisions specifying that a 
debtor must treat all similarly-situated creditors equally.364 
Furthermore, under Sunbeam, specific performance is not a guaranteed 
remedy upon rejection, but only a remedy that the non-rejecting party can 
pursue. However, to seek such a remedy, the non-rejecting party would have to 
litigate that request through the courts, and the trustee would likewise have to 
defend against that litigation.365 That defense would mean an additional 
administrative expense claim against the estate, which would have to be paid in 
cash in full for the debtor to receive a discharge. This additional priority 
payment would remove even more of the available assets of the estate from the 
unsecured creditors, and maybe even jeopardize the entire plan confirmation. 
Of course, a court could view this as an undue burden on the estate and use 
the equitable powers derived from § 105 to summarily terminate the contract, 
or modify or abrogate the rights of a party, but this too would require some 
degree of litigation that would drain the estate of scarce resources for the 
benefit of the unsecured creditors. It would be more efficient to utilize the 
rejection power of § 365, providing creditors with increased repayment and 
assisting in the fresh start of the debtor. 
b. Assisting the Debtor’s Fresh Start 
By the same reasoning, if the rejection functions as a termination of the 
license, and trademark is returned to the estate, then this can assist the debtor 
in achieving a successful fresh start. The Code will not allow for the 
confirmation of a plan that is not likely to be successful.366 In some scenarios, 
a license could be either an asset of significantly greater value or even the only 
asset of value in the estate. Thus, if the trustee has the power to reject and thus 
terminate the license, there is the possibility that it can negotiate for a new 
license imparting greater value to the estate.  
That greater value can then be used in ensuring the ongoing solvency of the 
debtor upon emergence from bankruptcy. Therefore, the rejection could be 
essential to ensuring that the debtor will not have to file for bankruptcy again, 
                                                          
 364 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 1123(a)(4), 1129(b)(2) (2012). 
 365 See Schwartz, supra note 245, at 292–93 (“[Specific performance] increases the administrative costs of 
the parties and the courts because of the expense entailed in creating and implementing specific performance 
decrees.”). 
 366 See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11). 
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thus enabling the fresh start. Beyond the goal, purposes and powers of 
bankruptcy, non-bankruptcy legal principles do not support the holding of 
Sunbeam. Traditionally, specific performance of any kind, such as allowing a 
licensee to retain its rights under a trademark license, has rarely been granted 
and should remain so. 
3. The Rarity of Specific Performance 
Even if nothing the court did in Sunbeam contradicts the Code, the remedy 
granted is a relatively rare one, and so Sunbeam should have little precedential 
value. Further, if such remedy would be granted on a regular basis, it could 
render the rejection power, a substantial part of § 365, practically meaningless 
and de facto superfluous as to trademark licenses, and a statute should be 
interpreted in such a way as to avoid a superfluous result.367 
Under the American justice system, outside of bankruptcy, courts generally 
only grant an equitable remedy when a legal remedy is unavailable or truly 
insufficient.368 One reason for this is the existence of a general preference to 
force a party to pay monetary damages rather than force a party to take an 
action or work with another party if it does not want to because that “would 
require the kind of ongoing supervision that strains judicial resources.”369 This 
is partly due to enforceability concerns, because courts historically have found 
that enforcement of a damages remedy is administratively easier and cheaper 
than a specific performance remedy.370 If a party violates an equitable order of 
specific performance, the only remedy is a contempt citation and a possible 
fine or jail time, making the supervision potentially more cumbersome.371 
                                                          
 367 See Corley v. U.S., 556 U.S. 303, 304 (2009) (“[A] statute should be construed [to give effect] to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 368 See Schwartz, supra note 245, at 272. 
 369 See TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co. 491 F.3d 625, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing New Park 
Forest Assoc. II v. Rogers Enters., 552 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. 
Co. v. Assoc’d Dry Goods Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1403, 1423–25 (N.D. Ind. 1992); CBL & Assoc. v. McCrory 
Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991); Ambassador Foods Corp. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 N.E.2d 
572, 575–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (“[C]ourts . . . refuse to decree the specific performance of a contract 
where . . . [it would] require constant and long-continued supervision by the court and further supplemental 
proceedings in order to enforce the defendant’s compliance with the decree and his performance of the 
constantly recurring duties of the contract.” (quoting 49 AM. JUR. (FIRST), Specific Performance § 70)). 
 370 See Schwartz, supra note 245, at 293 (“Judges may have to devote greater time and resources to 
tailoring and supervising a specific performance decree than would have to be devoted to devising and 
enforcing a damage judgment.”). 
 371 See TAS Distrib., 491 F.3d at 637; Davidson v. Schneider, No. 10-C-2101, 2014 WL 656780, at *5 
(N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2014); Mercedes-Benz USA L.L.C. v. Concours Motors, Inc., No. 07-C-0389, 2010 WL 
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Specific performance orders also touch on a party’s freedom, because 
“requiring performance interferes with the promisor’s liberty more than 
requiring the payment of money.”372 Some scholars advocate for greater use of 
specific performance as a remedy on the ground that the above objections are 
not as burdensome as they appear.373 However, at the moment, the significant 
weight of judicial authority has taken the stance of only granting specific 
performance in extraordinary situations, and is rarely mandatory and almost 
always discretionary.374 
The court’s reasoning in Sunbeam is fundamentally flawed for another 
reason, however. As stated above, the court noted that post-rejection, specific 
performance is not available against the debtor, but held that does not prevent 
the non-rejecting party from electing to retain its rights.375 As applied to the 
contract in Sunbeam, retaining its rights meant that the licensee was allowed to 
continue using the trademark.376 Section 365 only specifically addresses a 
limited number of types of executory contracts, and for those it guarantees 
specific performance.377 This means that debtor is required to allow the 
licensee to continue to use the trademark that the debtor owns, and to be 
effectively enjoined from bringing an infringement suit against the licensee. 
There is also an additional affirmative obligation associated with trademark 
licenses that is unique: the quality control requirement.378 While technically the 
trademark owner only needs to have the right to inspect the quality of the 
goods or services sold under the mark, realistically, any reasonably prudent 
mark owner should actually use that right and do some degree of monitoring to 
ensure the mark maintains its reputation and goodwill. Importantly, this 
requirement would be an ongoing requirement that would last the entire term 
of the license. 
                                                                                                                                      
55473, at *7 (E.D. Wis. Jan. 4, 2010); Yonan v. Oak Park Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 326 N.E.2d 773, 779 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1975); see also Schwartz, supra note 245, at 296–97. 
 372 See Schwartz, supra note 245, at 296–97. 
 373 See generally id. 
 374 Id. at 272 (“Specific performance is deemed an extraordinary remedy, awarded at the court’s 
discretion.”). 
 375 Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. Chi. Am. Mfg., L.L.C., 686 F.3d 372, 377 (7th Cir. 2012), cert. denied 133 S. 
Ct. 790 (2012). 
 376 Id. at 377–78. 
 377 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(h)–(i), (n) (2012). Section 365(o) addresses a mandatory assumption of any 
federal depository institution’s regulatory agency obligations, and § 365(p) addresses when the debtor is a 
lessee of personal property and rejects or fails to assume the lease of that property it is removed from the 
estate. 11 U.S.C. § 365(o)–(p). Thus, they have no relevance for the purposes of what rights remain for the 
non-rejecting party. 
 378 Park ‘N Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985). 
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Thus, even if in the great majority of contracts, allowing a licensee to retain 
its rights does not involve any affirmative obligations, trademark licenses are 
different. Imagine this scenario: 
Owner licenses his mark exclusively to Licensee, but enters into a bad 
contract that undervalues the mark, though it does include a strong quality 
control monitoring clause. Owner then enters bankruptcy because of the 
undervaluing of the mark, and other poor business decisions, and rejects the 
license agreement. Owner stands a greater chance of emerging from 
bankruptcy if he can get a commensurate value for his mark, and has made the 
affirmative decision he does not want to be in business anymore with Licensee. 
Licensee elects to retain his rights under Sunbeam, however. While technically 
Owner’s quality control duty under the license is now excused, and under 
Sunbeam’s reasoning not an order of specific performance, unless Owner 
wants to lose his rights in the mark, he would retain that right and obligation. 
Owner now realizes that because of the strong monitoring right given to 
him, he can effectively block Licensee from using the mark by setting the 
quality requirement at an unreasonably high or constantly changing level. Now 
the Licensee would return to court to try and get an order requiring the Owner 
to act reasonably under the contract. If granted, the order would place the court 
in the position to constantly monitor the behavior of the parties, which has 
often been the single factor why specific performance has not been granted 
when it otherwise would have been, even within Sunbeam’s own jurisdiction—
Illinois and the greater Seventh Circuit.379 
This makes trademark licenses different from almost any other type of 
executory contract, and thus while allowing a non-breaching party to retain its 
rights in most contexts might not involve an implicit order of specific 
performance, the rejection of a trademark license in bankruptcy does. 
Despite the Sunbeam court calling this remedy an instance of “the licensee 
retaining its rights,” the holding seems to be a de facto, if not de jure, order of 
specific performance in direct contradiction of the court’s own words in this 
                                                          
 379 TAS Distrib. Co. v. Cummins Engine Co. 491 F.3d 625, 637 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing New Park Forest 
Assoc. II v. Rogers Enters., 552 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)); Ambassador Foods Corp. v. 
Montgomery Ward & Co., 192 N.E.2d 572, 575–76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1963) (“[C]ourts . . . refuse to decree the 
specific performance of a contract where . . . [it would] require constant and long-continued supervision by the 
court and further supplemental proceedings in order to enforce the defendant’s compliance with the decree and 
his performance of the constantly recurring duties of the contract.” (quoting 49 AM. JUR. (FIRST), Specific 
Performance § 70)); see also Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Assoc’d Dry Goods Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1403, 1423–
25 (N.D. Ind. 1992); CBL & Assoc. v. McCrory Corp., 761 F. Supp. 807 (M.D. Ga. 1991).  
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very opinion.380 Another court has called this exactly what it is, an order of 
specific performance about an affirmative obligation.381 Granting specific 
performance should be avoided for another reason: it would render the 
rejection power superfluous. 
4. The Superfluous Language Canon 
Granting specific performance for trademark licensees and allowing them 
to retain their rights renders the rejection power superfluous to those debtors. 
As discussed above, in many situations involving trademark licenses, the only 
remaining performance obligations of a debtor-licensor are: the quality-control 
obligations, the duty of forbearance in the case of an exclusive license, or the 
duty of keeping a licensee appraised as to other licensees. In most cases, the 
latter two duties are extremely minor, and without the quality control 
requirement would arguably not constitute enough remaining performance due 
for the license to be considered executory.382 Thus, the only major performance 
obligation is the quality control requirement. 
As discussed above, however, if a trademark owner stops exercising the 
right of control over quality, it will lose all the rights and protections it has in 
the trademark. The logical result is that a trademark owner would never 
willingly excuse itself from this obligation. If specific performance is regularly 
granted, or as the Seventh Circuit puts it, if a non-rejecting party may 
commonly elect to retain its rights post-rejection, the only benefit from 
rejection would be to excuse the debtor from an obligation from which it 
realistically cannot excuse itself. The conclusion from this is that if the result 
in Sunbeam becomes commonplace, then the rejection power will be 
practically meaningless to a trademark licensor-debtor, and large portions of 
§ 365 would be rendered superfluous, at least to a certain class of debtors.383 
                                                          
 380 Sunbeam, 686 F.3d at 377 (“After rejecting a contract, a debtor is not subject to an order of specific 
performance.” (citing NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 531 (1984); Midway Motor Lodge of Elk 
Grove v. Innkeepers’ Telemgmt. & Equip. Corp., 54 F.3d 406, 407 (7th Cir. 1995))). 
 381 In re HQ Global Holdings, Inc., 290 B.R. 507, 513 (Bankr. D. Del. 2003) (“This argument misses the 
mark entirely. The essence of the [license] was the [d]ebtors’ affirmative grant to the [licensee] of the right to 
use their proprietary marks. As a result of the rejection, that affirmative obligation of the [d]ebtors to allow the 
[licensee] to use the marks is excused.”). 
 382 See In re Exide Techs. (Exide II), 607 F.3d 957, 963–64 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 383 See Thomas M. Ward, Conceptual Framework—Two Natures of the Intellectual Property Transfer: 
Contract and Property—Property Rights in the “Res”, I.P. COMMERCE § 4:5 (2012) (“[Sunbeam] treats the 
trademark license as the equitable equivalent of a nonrejectable [sic] conveyance of all trademark rights. . . .”). 
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CONCLUSION 
Executory contracts remain one of the most complicated areas of 
bankruptcy law, and have resulted in a wealth of confusion, mistakes, and 
misunderstandings in how to define, treat, and apply them. Over the last twenty 
years, courts treated rejection of a trademark license as a termination of the 
licensee’s rights, at least insofar as the continued use of the trademark. The 
licensee was limited to a general unsecured prepetition claim against the estate. 
This limitation has been essential to the debtor’s hopes of being able to repay 
its creditors and emerge fresh from bankruptcy, ready to begin anew. The 
Sunbeam court held that this was not the case, and awarded to the licensee the 
continued right to use the trademark. This holding contradicts twenty-plus 
years of jurisprudence. Lubrizol, not Sunbeam, is supported by an examination 
of the unique quality of trademarks and trademark licenses, the canons and 
doctrines of legal interpretation, and the underlying goals of bankruptcy law. 
Lubrizol should continue to remain the standard and Sunbeam should not be 
followed, allowing trademark owners entering bankruptcy to retain hope that 
they will be able to emerge successfully on the other side. That hope is 
essential, and should not be trampled needlessly or wantonly, just because a 
licensee cannot get past rejection. 
BENJAMIN H. ROTH∗ 
 
 
                                                          
 ∗ Executive Administrative Editor, Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal; J.D. Candidate, Emory 
University School of Law (2014); B.A., University of Wisconsin-Madison (2004); Winner of the 2014 Keith J. 
Shapiro Award for Excellence in Corporate Bankruptcy Writing. There are a lot of people that I would like to 
thank for their help on this Comment. First, my advisor, Professor Rafael I. Pardo, for painstakingly working 
through my arguments, draft after draft, and especially helping me to see the counterarguments and to 
strengthen my responses. I would also like to thank Professor Charles A. Shanor for reviewing my statutory 
interpretation sections. Most especially, I would like to thank Theodore H. Davis Jr. and Alfred S. Lurey from 
Kilpatrick Townsend & Stockton LLP, and David A. Wender from Alston & Bird LLP for all their help in 
reviewing my Comment numerous times and helping me with all facets of my arguments. And, of course, I 
would like to thank my parents, Andy and Judy, and my siblings, Lani, David, Tori, Spencer, and Katie, for all 
their help and support over the years. 
